

[CONFIDENTIAL PRINT]

**RESCUE OF THE JEWISH AND OTHER PEOPLES IN
NAZI-OCCUPIED TERRITORY**

EXTRACT FROM

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H. Res. 350 and H. Res. 352

**RESOLUTIONS PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
BY THE EXECUTIVE OF A COMMISSION TO
EFFECTUATE THE RESCUE OF THE
JEWISH PEOPLE OF EUROPE**

NOVEMBER 26, 1943

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NOTICE

Since this hearing was held, during which time the testimony contained herein was given, it has been determined that it need not be held in confidence any longer and it is consequently released for public information.

By order of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

SOL BLOOM, *Chairman*.

RESCUE OF THE JEWISH AND OTHER PEOPLES IN NAZI-OCCUPIED TERRITORY

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:30 a. m., Hon. Sol Bloom (chairman), presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will kindly come to order. The committee is now in executive session for further consideration of House Resolution 350 providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe, and House Resolution 352 providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe.

* * * * *

The Chairman would like to state that I asked Mr. Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, to appear before this committee and give us information regarding these two resolutions. The Secretary asked me if we were to be in executive session so that he may be able to give certain testimony that up to now it has been considered advisable to hold strictly confidential, and I informed the Secretary that this committee has always kept its word when we were in executive session, and he would be asked to testify, and everything that he testified to before this committee, will be strictly confidential and not go outside of the committee room until released.

Mr. Long, you can testify with the assurance that whatever you say here will be in strict confidence.

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I present Mr. Long, Assistant Secretary of State.

STATEMENT OF HON. BRECKINRIDGE LONG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. LONG. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am glad to come before you, and I asked Mr. Bloom about the executive nature of the session because there are certain things which I think you will appreciate, as we get into them, that are for the time being confidential, and if they were not retained within the confidence of this committee and kept from our enemies, the actions contemplated and the operations would not be possible to be carried forward, and it would react against the interests of the people that we are trying to help and are interested in.

You have before you these two resolutions. I think that for a full understanding of them, it would be necessary for you to have an idea of what has happened and something of the history of this whole refugee question. It has never been disclosed, or put together or given to any governmental agency, and with your permission I would like to start at the beginning and carry it through. It will be a long

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story. I think that it will be worth while for your fuller understanding.

I came to Washington the day after the war started in Europe. I came here by pre-arrangement on an "if" basis, if the war started. I arrived here on the 2d day of September 1939, and went to work for the Department of State and took charge of a division called, for the lack of a better name, the Special Division, which in itself was a basket in which were put all the emergency problems growing out of the war affecting the United States, for which there was no other agency existing in the Department to handle them.

The first thing that we had to do was to get American citizens back home, and through our efforts—directly and indirectly—more than 100,000 American citizens were safely returned to the United States from enemy territory.

ADMISSION OF REFUGEES INTO THE UNITED STATES

About October or November, Mr. William Green, of the American Federation of Labor, came to see me one afternoon, and he depicted this situation:

There were in Lithuania a number of persons who had fled from Germany and fled from Poland who were heads of the trade unions in eastern and central Europe. He thought that they were going to be destroyed and that the trade union movement would be dealt a vicious blow by the Fascist governments because the leaders of the movement were going to be killed. Four or five of these men had been arrested, separated from their families or were held incommunicado. He asked me if we could do something to help them. We sat there and discussed the general principles involved, and among other considerations, we went back over the functions of the Department of State. Up to that time the Department of State had been the agency of the American Government to protect solely the interests of United States citizens abroad. If an American citizen got into a difficulty abroad and his rights were being infringed, the State Department immediately intervened in his behalf. He, as an American citizen, had a right to the protection of his Government. Furthermore, if he owned property in other lands and that property was confiscated by law or some damage done to its physical being, the State Department immediately intervened and tried to secure for him reparation. Up to that time, the State Department had never intervened or undertaken movements on behalf of persons who were not American citizens, but as he and I discussed it that afternoon, we came to the conclusion the trade-union movement in the world was of interest to the United States and was a system that had its counterpart here and was a vital part of American economic and social life, and on that account it would be a legitimate activity for the Department of State to intervene in behalf of these persons who were threatened, as Mr. Green had portrayed.

We immediately took up the matter. Lithuania was then an independent government and we had a Minister there. The name of these men I forget.

We succeeded in getting them released from confinement. Each of these men and each of the members of their families were given visas to come to the United States. Two of the men took advantage of our

help and accompanied by their wives and children came, but two of them sent their families and decided to stay behind.

Actually, this was not the first action of the State Department to rescue persecuted persons because we had admitted to the United States, as refugees from persecution in Germany, Austria, and other places, several hundred thousand of these people in the period from 1933, when the Hitlerite government began its efforts, until 1939. At that time we found ourselves at the outbreak of the war, but we had been active and had given refuge in the United States to several hundred thousand of them.

When the war began and Germany invaded Poland, there was a mass of people frightened to death. They had been frightened by the broadcasts emanating from Germany. The Germans tried to terrorize the neighboring people of those countries, and when the destruction started, and the airplanes and the big guns and the big tanks rolled through Poland, the people were frightened, and literally several million of them moved eastward in front of the German armies. The roads were filled with people walking and riding with donkeys and horses and carts and automobiles. The people that did not have any conveyance were traveling on foot, the young and the old and the weak and the strong and the sick and the well, and as they went east they were eventually dispersed over various parts of Russian territory and found themselves behind the Russian lines. Some of them died at the roadside. Some of them were sick. Some of them were killed by machine guns of the Germans. Some of them rested where they were. Some of them, their shoes worn-out and their feet bleeding, were in a terrible state of affairs. Hundreds of thousands of them finally settled in Siberia. About 100,000 of them trickled down east of the Caspian Sea, and crossed into Iran, and we subsequently picked them up down there. The British took the able-bodied men and organized them into fighting units and amalgamated them with what they called the Middle East Command.

The women, the children, the young, the old, the sick, were given attention through the instrumentality of private organizations. We and the British took care of about 40,000 of these people. A few of them are still in Iran. Thousands of them are in Africa where places were vacated. The question arose of where to put these people, how to clothe them, how to feed them, and how to transport them. Our ships were busy taking supplies to the British in the Near East, and the British ships were busy reinforcing their own forces there and carrying supplies and ammunition to them, and it was difficult to find transportation to move them away from there. It was impractical to move them across deserts and walk them 500 miles from there to Palestine.

The United States contributed I don't know how many dollars to feed and succor these people. The Red Cross did yeoman service and it was one of our first big-scale activities. Some of these people got to Karachi, India, and were taken care of by the British Government. We arranged with the British Government to take many prisoners of war held by the British and thus permitted the cantonments which they had built for these prisoners of war in East Africa to be used by these poor refugees. We continued to send them relief supplies. Others of them came to us and through the allotments from the President's emergency fund, which the Congress voted him to use in his discretion, he agreed to pay the expenses of bringing some

thousands of them to Mexico which country had promised to give them refuge.

Many of those people are in Mexico and others of them have not yet arrived, but arrangements have been made and they are on the way.

Now, that was the eastern movement. There was a northern movement. People fled from Poland, northern Poland, and from northeast Germany and fled north to Lithuania, Estonia, and Russia. Subsequently, the war in the west had started. Germany invaded France and the Low Countries, and when she attacked Holland and Belgium, the migration started westward. It was a worse migration and a more complicated migration than that which had occurred in the *hejira* eastward. This *hejira* westward preceded the onslaught of the German armies, and the German airplanes flew over the roads and strafed these people. The roads were so crowded that sometimes there was no movement on them. Automobiles would break down, tires would get punctured, carts would break, and the people that were in them could not move. There was no opportunity for repairs. The roads were clogged and literally millions of people went from northern France westward, and from Holland and Belgium westward, until they got in the neighborhood of Paris, and then converged on Paris. They went through Paris and around Paris as the German armies approached. They kept on going. All of them wanted to come to the United States as a haven of refuge. Our consulates were swamped. We then had consulates all through France. Some of the consulates were closed temporarily because of the war and some of them were burned, and the personnel had often to go into shelters just as the other people did. Some of our consulates were destroyed, but except for those interruptions, both before and after, our consulates were busy granting visas to these refugees as they applied to come to the United States. As the Germans occupied the territory which later became known as occupied France, they left temporarily free and partially untrampled this region known later as unoccupied France, and we found ourselves in the position where, still having relations with Germany, we had our consulates and our diplomatic officers in northern France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and for a while we had them in Poland. We granted visas to a great many of the Polish people so that they could get out. Then Germany autocratically closed our consulates in Poland and we were unable to give visas to persons unless they could get to some consulate outside of Poland, and the Germans made it very difficult for people to travel so that they could get to an American consulate. Nevertheless, our consulates in Austria and in Germany, and in all the other occupied territories, were busy granting visas.

Then, finally, in June 1941, Germany notified us that our consuls would have to be removed from all of Germany and from occupied territory and the exercise of the consular function would have to cease as of the 30th of June of that year. So on that date we no longer had agencies within that territory to grant visas to these people, and we could not take care of persons and give them visas unless they got out of Germany, or out of control of Germany. There was no way by which they could reach our consuls, or by which our consuls could get to them because Germany had autocratically said, "You will have to get out by June 30," and we did have to get out, and we

did get out, and the consulates were closed as of the evening of June 30, 1941.

The situation that developed outside of the occupied territories was such that some of them could get out and elude the authorities, and a great many of them did, and our consulates during this period of migration, during the westward hegira, were literally swamped. There were lines a half mile long every day, all day. It was not possible to give the proper attention to the people and comply with the requirements of law quick enough to take care of them, and besides that, we were bound more or less by the limitations placed upon us, bound by the limitations and by the law in regard to the granting of immigrant visas, and we exercised at that period a very generous and I think humane attitude toward the granting of visitors' visas which I will relate to you in some detail.

We found that some people got down as far as Marseilles, they got to Barcelona in Spain, and there were so many people that they got on boats and went across to north Africa to Casablanca and places in north Africa where we had consulates. They trickled down through Spain and across the Pyrenees, and down to Barcelona and cities in Portugal where we had consulates, and in every one of these places our consuls were just so busy, busy as they could be for months and months and months, with the constant demands of the most horrifying personal experiences of these people.

Literally, the records of the reports of the consular officers to the Department of State form one of the most thrilling and one of the most saddening and awful pages of our humanitarian history.

One man tried to kill himself right in front of the consul because he was ineligible to a visa to the United States under the immigration laws. Another man fell down and grasped the knees of the consul and begged, and other would fall down and kiss their feet and pray for a visa. Others that were able to and were in a different status and of some little means would slip in the passport a sum of money. They resorted to every expedient and manifested every form of human expression of a desire to get a visa to come to the United States. Under those circumstances, we found ourselves in a situation that the quotas were exhausted in the territories from where the people originated, and under our law, a man who is born in Germany comes under the German quota irrespective of where the man finds himself. If he is born in Germany he is under the German quota and the countries from which these refugees originated—Germany, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, northern France, Austria, and so on, have relatively small quotas. The total quota for that area is about 57,000. Well, 57,000 visas were just insufficient to express the humane desire of the American Government and the American people to try and save these persons. During the 12 months which ended in June 1941, enough visas were granted to physically save 135,000 of these people, and in the period from 1938 to 1942 a total of over 307,000 visas of all kinds were granted to persons coming from enemy or enemy occupied territory.

Before I get into the home situation, I want to give you something more of the problem to the north, the northern hegira. It was not the same hegira because they did not have a chance to move. The people had moved out of Lithuania and Poland and out of northern Germany into the territory lying immediately north. They found themselves

under the jurisdiction of the Germans, and immediately thereafter, under the jurisdiction of the Russians, and then those States were incorporated into Russia. I received a delegation here of orthodox rabbis who came from an area to which I now refer, that is, Lithuania, northern Poland and northern and eastern Germany, and East Prussia, and they said that there were in those areas groups of rabbis, rabbinical colleges, persons who were the light of the church and who carried the torch of truth and the essence of the Jewish religion.

They were the cultural exponents of Judaism in these rabbinical colleges. These young men were being educated by the best minds of the Jewish people in that area. These young boys had been collected, and their teachers were trying to educate them to carry on the religious leadership of their people. Could I help them? I said that, of course, we would do everything we could. So they gave us lists of names on which there were hundreds of those people. We telegraphed those lists to our Embassy in Moscow with instructions for the Ambassador to communicate with each one of those persons and tell him that a visa would be given to him if he appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow and identified himself. A great many of them came. The news got around that visas were to be had at the American Embassy in Moscow. Thousands of those who had not received notices and whose names had not been given to us also went to Moscow.

Many of them got visas, but many of them who were entitled to visas under our arrangement did not get them. They got on the trains and went on through to Siberia, down to Korea, through Korea to Manchuria, and finally to Japan. Some of them got to the United States. The names of others we telegraphed to the Embassy in Tokyo, saying, "If these people appear, you are free to give them visas." We did the same thing through our Embassy in China, which was then at Nanking.

Then transportation across the Pacific Ocean ceased. We got into the war. All shipping stopped, and there were thousands of these people in Tokyo. The Japanese Government allowed them to stay there for several months and then ordered them to move on further. They could not move, so the Japanese loaded them onto ships and took them down to Shanghai. They are now at Shanghai.

I have just recently had a supplication from another group of rabbis who are interested in one of the rabbinical colleges which started from northern Poland, went through Lithuania, all the way through Russia, and is today intact in Shanghai. There are 464 persons in this particular group. The rabbis want to bring them over here. They wanted to bring them on an exchange ship. I had to take the position that we could not accommodate them on an exchange ship, because that was for American citizens, and for every non-American who got on board, it would be necessary to leave an American citizen in a Japanese internment camp. I did not think we were justified in leaving Americans over there and bringing other persons out of there.

That is a faint impression, a very hurried painting with a very big brush, of the disturbances in central and eastern Europe, that precipitated these people, like the fragments of a bursting bomb, east through the Urals, south through the Indian Ocean, north through the Arctic, and south again through the Mediterranean and western ports of Africa, one of the most terrible and tragic experiences any

man ever had to go through. I have sat and wrestled with the different problems that grew out of this, gauging the capacity of the American Government to do it, the instrumentalities that could be used, and the moneys available. It is difficult to make a promise that we are going to help half a million people if you have not money with which to help them—and you cannot get money in 15 or 20 minutes or 2 weeks. Sometimes these problems do not wait that long for solution, and I will take up a few of them later, when I come to specific problems in connection with some of these activities.

That was the position in Europe, generally speaking, as we here, back home looked at it. We were bound by laws—immigration laws. We could do certain things; certain things we could not do. We did every legitimate thing we could do, and we observed the laws of the United States. The President set up what is called the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, headed by Mr. McDonald, of New York, and the acting secretary of which was Mr. George Warren, capable, able, industrious, intelligent gentlemen, each of whom had considerable experience in refugee work.

That committee was trying to save particular persons who were worthy to be saved in the cause of humanity—intellectuals—that is, authors, painters, orators, statesmen, political leaders, and publishers of newspapers, men who had, because of their race, religion, political beliefs, and opposition to the Nazi regime, incurred the enmity, animosity, and violent opposition of that regime, and who would be killed. That committee considered those people and submitted lists to the State Department, and we tried to help everybody that they recommended to us. They would receive from other sources the names of persons, and they would investigate those people and recommend to us the issuance of visas to them in order that they might be saved. They did a very good work. We had some difficulty, of course, in meeting all of their desires, because from time to time we ran up against the problem of the security of the United States. Since I have been in supervisory control of this activity for the Secretary, I have never lost sight of the security of the United States. I might say, too, that we finally came to realize that it would be necessary to take a little different step, different measures, in order to protect the security of the United States, because we found that Germany was putting its agents in the guise of refugees in some of these migratory movements and that the idea was to have them get visas, come to the United States, and here engage in a pernicious activity against the United States. I think the records of the F. B. I. will show that there was quite a good deal of that at one time and that there were in this country certain persons to whom these persons were under instructions to report when they arrived here. So when that developed, we decided that it would be to the advantage of this country, and easier for the refugees, to handle the refugee problem if we set up in the State Department a control commission through which these persons would have to be screened. So we did. It took a little time to get it set up, but it was set up, and it has been functioning ever since; and more fortunately, it was functioning 6 months before we entered the war, and the screens through which these applications had to go, served to prevent entry into the United States of many agents who otherwise would have been here.

It has not interfered with the flow of refugees under the law. Of course, in 1941, shipping across the Atlantic stopped. When we got into the war, there was no neutral shipping. In December 1941 most neutral shipping disappeared from the seas. Prior to that there had been neutral shipping, and some American ships had been running; but as of that time there was practically nothing. There are today a few little Spanish and a few little Portuguese vessels which are coming in here, and the State Department continues to issue visas to refugees. We are issuing visas to the extent of about 100 a week. Perhaps it is a little under, perhaps it is a little more; but it is in the neighborhood of 100 a week. They are all carefully screened, and they are persons in whom I think the people of the United States can have entire confidence.

But the point is that the historic attitude of the United States as a haven for the oppressed has not been stopped. The Department of State has kept the door open. It is carefully screened, but the door is open, and the demands for a wider opening cannot be justified for the time being because there just is not any transportation. There are vacancies on the list of quotas, and any wholesome, proper person who appears and applies for permission to enter the United States can, under the laws and under the direction of the Department of State, enter the United States.

Mr. MUNDT. The limitation of 100 per week is now imposed by the shipping limitations rather than by any limitations of the State Department as to the number of visas available?

Mr. LONG. The movement of people has stopped. You cannot move anywhere in the world today except in the United States. You can go from the United States to Canada, you can go from the United States to Mexico, you can go from the United States to Cuba. This is the only place in the world where you can move. Anywhere else you have to get exit permits to go even across rivers. Everything is under military control throughout Europe. There is not one town in Europe today from which you can leave to go to another town in Europe without military control or some supervision or some permission. This is the only country in the world today which admits alien enemies by nationality into its intimate midst as citizens if they care to come—the only country in the world.

This is roughly—very roughly—the situation that appeared in the United States and the situation that existed in the United States. I have used the word "screening." I mean by that that there is a procedure set up in the State Department. It is an interdepartmental activity. Representatives of the War Department, Navy Department, Department of Justice, and Department of State sit, and through this committee persons are examined. If there is a negative decision, there is a right of appeal to a review committee which sits and holds public hearing. If there is a negative decision there, it goes above to two men, one of whom is former Senator Bulkley, of Ohio; the other member unfortunately died recently, Mr. Frederick Keppel, former Assistant Secretary of War. Those two gentlemen served as a board of appeal. They were appointed by the President and were not subject to the control of the Department of State.

They could exercise their discretion in the admission of persons who had been denied admission below. Mr. Keppel, after a very long

public service, unfortunately died suddenly. His place has been taken by Judge Helmick. Judge Helmick was formerly of the United States Court in China and has had a long record of public service and, I think, has the confidence of the people. Mr. R. B. Ribble, dean of the Law School of the University of Virginia, is the alternate member of the board.

If the decision is negative all the way through, at the end of 6 months there is an opportunity to reinstitute the application. That is as to the situation here, and we have glanced at the situation as it was in Europe.

All the efforts that we made to secure help for the people who were actually within the confines, jurisdiction, and control of the German Government ceased as of July 1, 1941. After that we were unable to do anything in Germany, in Austria, in northern France, or in any of those places, as we had done before. We could not issue visas to those people because we could not reach them to deliver the visas. So there the situation has changed somewhat.

Something over a year ago a delegation of some of the Jewish leaders talked to me, and they thought that it would be far better if there could be, instead of one government being active, other governments taking part in this activity. Of course, we had no desire to inject any difference of thought in the circle of the governments which are united in the war. It was the United States Government itself and alone, practically, which had done most of these things. However, we did have the solid help and cooperation of the British Government.

We and the British were looking toward the placing of some of these people who found themselves in Persia. We have had the support of other governments, like Mexico, in its gracious movement to receive thousands of these refugees there. But by and large it was the United States and Great Britain which formulated the policy and which carried it into execution. We have taken into this country since the beginning of the Hitler regime and the persecution of the Jews, until today, approximately 580,000 refugees. The whole thing has been under the quota, during the period of 10 years—all under the quota—except the generous gesture we made with visitors' and transit visas during an awful period. But, as I say, the United States Government is the one that formulated the policy and which carried out these various steps and tried to be helpful in every instance to every person who was persecuted, and we have recognized from the start that the Jews were the most persecuted and were the object of more antipathy than any other section or class of the people, though they were not the only ones. From time to time there have been terrible wholesale executions of other people, like recently in Poland after Hamburg was bombed out and made uninhabitable, just as Berlin and the country along the Ruhr are now being made uninhabitable. The Germans went into northern Poland with their armed forces and just hunted down the people there and killed them like rats and threw them away. Then they took over the houses of the Poles and transported to them their own people.

As I said, about a year or more ago several of these gentlemen came to see me and said that they appreciated the fact that we had carried a pretty heavy load, and they thought it would be more effective if we had other nations associated with us; if we could make this an inter-governmental movement and identify other governments with it. I

readily agreed. We then tried to cast about for a method of cooperation with other governments. The first suggestion made was that the United Nations be the body and that they do this themselves. However, after considering that suggestion we came to the conclusion that that would be inadequate, because there were the countries who were neutral and who were contiguous to the territory in which these people were being persecuted, and they would not be available as avenues of egress if they were not included in the movement. Then the idea was to get some of them or all of them, if possible, identified with us. When we had considered that, we came to the conclusion that it probably would be difficult to get some other countries to join a new organization during the war.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

So we considered a little further, and then we chose the product of President Roosevelt's suggestion back in 1938, when he called the Evian meeting to consider the plight of the refugees and persons who had been persecuted by this oppression. There had grown out of that what was called an intergovernmental committee. Thirty-two nations belonged to that committee, neutrals and belligerents; but Germany did not belong, of course, because at that time this action was aimed more or less at a program which was being carried on by Germany. Likewise, Austria and the little satellite countries did not belong. But the other governments did.

Mr. MUNDT. Did Russia belong?

Mr. LONG. No; I do not believe Russia ever belonged. Thirty-two nations did belong. Here is a list of them, and I shall be very glad to read them: The United States of America, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, United Kingdom, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Venezuela. That is 29. There were three others who belonged—Costa Rica, Panama, and Guatemala—but they have not yet joined in the present movement. They have been invited along with 17 additional countries and if all accept it will mean a membership of 49 nations on the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees.

We decided that the thing to do since we had already a number of governments parties to this, was to revitalize it, reform it, invigorate it, hitch up the horse to the old surrey, and go down the road with it. That was the best instrumentality that we had at hand. We could not form another one because some might not join. It was carefully considered at the White House and the State Department. Mr. Myron Taylor, in whom the country has confidence, was the American member of the executive committee, and still is. He takes a very great interest in this whole thing. We confer every week. Sometimes two or three times a day we have talked about this.

BERMUDA CONFERENCE ON REFUGEES

So it was decided that we would do that, but it could not be done except with the cooperation of the British Government. Other governments were not as interested as we were, and along with the British Government in this activity, we thought we could induce the other nations to come along, because several of the units of the British Empire

were members of the organization as well as of the United Kingdom. So we asked the British Government if they would confer with us to see what we could do along this line, and they said they would. We did not want a meeting either here or in London, and when the British Government learned of it, it said, "Let us meet at Bermuda; it is half way across." So we said that was all right; we would go to Bermuda. At Bermuda we conferred.

This is a part of the record that is going to be extremely confidential from now on, until it is released, and I must ask you, gentlemen, to respect the whole of it, because it is difficult to pick out this part and that and say that one is more confidential than the other.

The conference at Bermuda came to some very definite findings and recommendations. While this goes on the record, I am asking the committee to consider it most confidential for the time being.

The CHAIRMAN. Everything you have stated here today is strictly confidential. We are in executive session, and you need not be afraid that anything will leak out, because it is all confidential.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BERMUDA CONFERENCE

Mr. LONG. We have reached the point in my rather rough, rambling narrative of the refugee movement where we have tried to get an inter-governmental body to do the job which the United States had for so long been doing. We came to an understanding on the following recommendations of the Bermuda Conference: That the United States and the United Kingdom Governments should consult together with the view toward immediate action to obtain the use of neutral shipping for the transportation of refugees, this duty to be assumed by the Inter-governmental Committee after a revision of its mandate. Its charter did not provide for some of the activities which we considered it would be necessary to engage in. So we proposed to the British Government and have urged the member nations to enlarge the scope of their activity.

Another point was that the United States and the United Kingdom should continue their efforts for the release from Spain of the French refugees and other allied nationals; if this should be unsuccessful, then both categories would be referred to the Intergovernmental Committee. There were in Spain at that time about 30,000 people who had come across the Pyrenees. There were French citizens, there were German refugees, there were all manner of people who had escaped into Spain. The Spanish Government had placed them in internment camps. Before we got to Bermuda, before this was engaged in, we engaged in an effort to try to get these people moved, and we had the cooperation of the British Government. Eventually it became necessary to get the cooperation of the Portuguese Government and the French National Committee in north Africa, because it was to French territory that we were planning to take these people, part of them for permanent residence, and part of them for temporary residence. But today the movement has been so successful that there are remaining now in Spain only a few thousand of these allied nationals. Of the stateless refugees who found their way in, there are remaining today only about 1,200. Provision has been made to transfer them—and the movement is now current; it has all been agreed to by the governments concerned, and the French Committee—to a place of residence temporarily in north Africa. About 600 or 700

people who escaped from France into Spain have in the regular course of procedure been given visas and have come to the United States. The British Government is trying to take some of them in case they cannot be temporarily located in north Africa. Many of them have visas for Palestine, and the rest of them will be taken care of in north Africa until such time as permanent arrangements can be made for them. That was one of the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference, and it is being carried out.

Another Bermuda proposal was for the arrangement of temporary residence in north Africa subject to military considerations, and the necessity for considering General Eisenhower's opinion on the movement and of its interference with his own military activities there, his lines of communication, the use of boats to transport these people, and that sort of thing; and the French National Committee.

The idea of getting them out of Spain was that Spain could not afford to keep them there. Spain is not a rich country. I think about 60,000 people came across the border over the Pyrenees. Spain could not afford to keep these people, particularly because of its difficulty in feeding its own people in time of war and the limitations imposed by the transportation of food supplies. So the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee here and several other agencies were interested in sending money into Spain to help them help these refugees, and they were very successful. We supported them in every respect and recommended them to the Ambassador, and asked the Ambassador to help them and arrange with the Spanish Government for them, and they were able to get these people out of refugee camps into hotels and to pay for their existence until we could get them out of Spain. The object of getting them out of Spain was that we wanted to siphon the people out of that country. You could not send a regiment in there to pull people out of Paris; the regiment would disappear in the course of a night. The German Armies would close around them. But if you could by the various underground movements, and one thing or another, aid people to get across the Pyrenees and into Spain, Spain would not stop them on her side from coming in if we would get them out of Spain and they were in passage through Spain. So the Spanish situation is practically cleared up. We are ready to take all new refugees who come out of France or out of other occupied territory. Spain will assist them.

Spain did stop. There was one period right after the German occupation of unoccupied France, when so many people—hundreds of them—started across the border, when the Spanish Government sent its armies up there and said, "Stop." So we immediately took it up with the Spanish Government in Madrid. We said, "Do not stop these people from coming in; we will try to get them out. That is the job of the Germans on the other side of the mountains; but if they do not stop them, don't you stop them."

They said, "All right." They withdrew their armies—they were there only 3 days—and since that time the flow has been coming.

The United States and the United Kingdom agreed to go to the French National Committee in order to secure favorable consideration of a proposal to admit refugees to Madagascar, trying to find places in case they were available in large numbers. If refugees were available, there should be places to put them, perhaps in Cyrenaica, Palestine, north Africa, and other places.

The United States and the United Kingdom Governments adopted, and are urging adoption by the European Allied Governments, of a joint declaration concerning the return of the refugees to their homes after the war. That was a very important matter which will require the cooperation of our governments in the peace treaties. It is one of those things you do not want to talk about. We do not want to talk about it now. But the Axis Nations from which these people have been forced to flee must be forced by the peace treaties, and the military if necessary, to allow these people, if they desire, to return home.

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain and Russia alike have agreed on that post-war condition. It takes some time to get governments to agree on solemn matters, but we have agreed.

The next conference recommendation is that the Intergovernmental Committee be invited to revise its mandate. That mandate was not sufficient to allow these activities. We and Great Britain have agreed on the revised mandate and the whole thing is under way.

The next recommendation is that the membership of the Intergovernmental Committee be broadened to include any nations which desire to participate in the work, and to invite other nations to do so.

The next is that provision be made for the procurement of public and private funds adequate for the work of the Intergovernmental Committee. The funds of the Intergovernmental Committee are to be provided. The United States and Great Britain each pay one-half of the cost of the entire project which the Intergovernmental Committee decides upon as being possible of execution, and which is recommended and acceptable to both of our Governments. Nobody knows what the cost of those projects will be or where the activity will be. The administrative expenses of the Intergovernmental Committee are to be paid by the United States through a regular appropriation of the Congress. There has been in years past a small appropriation out of which we paid the secretariat and contributed our small share of the administrative expense.

The next Bermuda recommendation was that the staff of the Intergovernmental Committee be increased and a management committee created; that is, to revitalize it and give it an executive committee with an executive secretary. Mr. Patrick Malin, who is well known in the United States—he is a member of the Quakers, and their relief societies, and has had much experience in relief and refugee work—thus became the vice director under Sir Herbert Emerson, the director.

Furthermore, the Bermuda Conference stated that the following points be referred to the Intergovernmental Committee for its urgent consideration immediately subsequent to the ratification of its mandate; the possibility of finding countries of asylum for Polish refugees in Persia, for whom no destination has hitherto been allotted. There are about 8,000 or 8,000 who still remain as a remnant of that mass migration, of which something over 100,000 got into Iran.

The next recommendation is the admission of refugee children of France through any neutral country. We tried to save children from France and offered to accept in this country about 5,000 of them. We made arrangements with the French Government to do so. The German Government refused to sanction the agreement. There

were about 200 of them who entered the United States instead of 5,000. The German Government absolutely and positively refused to agree to it but went on record as stating that it did not desire to have those children leave and would not permit it.

Another recommendation is a provision to feed and finance refugees in neutral countries—Switzerland, Spain, Turkey—if they get there. I will speak of Sweden and Switzerland in a few minutes.

Another Bermuda recommendation was to ascertain the possibility of the reception of refugees into various overseas countries.

So much concerns the Bermuda recommendations. Now, as regards feeding and financing refugees in neutral countries, since that time Switzerland has had an influx, like Sweden, except very much greater than Sweden—perhaps about 60,000 of them, if my figures are correct. About 60,000 persons have sought refuge in Switzerland since the debacle in Italy. Not all of them are Jewish people. Some of them are military; they are from the Italian Army and wanted to quit and get out. Some are American citizens who were living in northern Italy. Many are Jewish people from northern Italy, and some are Jewish people from that part of France which was under Italian occupation. Then, there are various other categories of persons making up the total of approximately 60,000.

Switzerland is confronted with a situation where she has to have some help. She cannot take care of 60,000 people when she is living on a ration. We ration Switzerland. Germany rations Switzerland as to the food she can import and the things she needs and what things she can export in return for it. Switzerland cannot just say, "Come in; there is a turkey for dinner"; there is no turkey. So there is under consideration by our governmental authorities the making of an allowance to the Swiss economy in order that she may be able to feed these people.

Another situation developed in Sweden, with reference to refugees who went there. Sweden graciously opened her doors and admitted somewhere between 8,000 and 9,000, of whom about 6,000 were Jewish. There were 6,000 registered Jews in Denmark, and about 8,000 people fled, and about 80 percent of them were Jewish and arrived in Sweden, so practically all the Jews in Denmark were saved. There were two small boatloads which we understand—not authoritatively, for it is hard to get information as to what exactly goes on in Germany—but we understand there were two small boatloads taken from Copenhagen to Gdynia and put to work there. Germany is looking for labor. She has got all her own German men in the army, and she wants labor back home. She is making the people work as hard as she can for long hours and under hard conditions. It is forced labor. She has done it with a million French prisoners of war that she has and with the Italians that she has induced to go to Germany and with all the people she can drag out of Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and all surrounding countries, that are not German, and she makes them go into the German productive machinery and work 15, 16, or 18 hours a day.

Now, those were the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference. They constituted evidences of agreement between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on this general refugee problem. Since then, as a result of that, this committee set up in London is actually there at work today. There are proposals being made to it today and every day. It has regular stated meetings.

These are the recommendations which the conferees at Bermuda considered feasible to make at that time. It should be remembered, however, that the Bermuda Conference considered many other questions not covered by these recommendations. The conferees in whom the British and American Governments had and have the greatest confidence considered every possible phase of the refugee question and particularly the tragic situation of the Jewish people of Europe. They examined every possibility for their rescue and relief no matter how remote it seemed at that time. It should also be remembered that the conferees, while not competent finally to pass upon the military considerations involved in many of these questions, had nevertheless to keep them constantly in mind.

UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF ADDITIONAL REFUGEE PROJECTS

I have here another memorandum. I think I can take up the things that have the support of our Government irrespective of projects that we have discussed in the Intergovernmental Committee program and the results of the Bermuda Conference.

The first is the question of an assembly center in north Africa for the refugees from Spain, which since its institution has been carried on by the United States and British Governments independently of the Bermuda Conference, although it was initiated by the Bermuda Conference, and it has actually borne fruit in that the larger committee have actually now given their formal consent to the camp and everything. Arrangements are presently being made for the transportation of the remaining 1,200 stateless persons out of Spain into Africa. I might also mention in this last transaction Portugal graciously answered our request to let them go through Portugal to Portuguese ports on the Atlantic, there to take ship down to Africa.

We have had also—we still have—the program for refuge for Jewish children in other neutral countries. In one case the neutral Government asked the German Government to let her take persons that would be selected for her somehow by some charitable or proper organizations in Germany—20,000 Jewish children—and take them out of Germany and into its own territory, and that she would take care of them there and that we would contribute to their expense. The neutral Government was unable to get any favorable response from the German Government. The original inquiry is still in process. The German Government, the request having been made some time ago, has not indicated that it will accept; nevertheless, we are trying to get the neutral Government to continue its activities.

Mr. VORYS. Are there more than 20,000?

Mr. LONG. There are 20,000 children in addition to other refugees.

Then we are going to support the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in its efforts to send food from Turkey, through the International Red Cross Committee, to the Jews in Transnistria. It is hard to get things. We have been trying to help the J. D. C. get food supplies, but the food supplies must be obtained within the blockade. The blockade military officers and the blockade authorities will not permit food to be shipped through the blockade to German-occupied territory or to Germany. I think that, with every assurance of success, this arrangement will be concluded.

There is the maintenance of Polish refugees in Mexico, which I mentioned on several occasions. It is not necessary to refer to that now except to say that that movement is still current. Only about 2 weeks ago another boatload arrived, and there are other boatloads expected. It is a question of finding ships that can carry people, even coming back from the fronts today, coming back across the ocean.

Then there is the offer to Switzerland of assistance in caring for refugees escaping from Axis-held territory into that country. We offered to help Switzerland and as far as our economy permits.

Then, there is the project of cooperation with the British Government in an endeavor to evacuate refugees from the Balkans to Palestine through Turkey. That has not been successful in the past. We had tried various schemes at the time of the Bermuda Conference. There was a proposal that two ships would be chartered; they would leave a port on the Black Sea and go to Turkey, from where the refugees would go directly to Palestine. They would carry 5,000 Jewish children. When they called me one morning, we could not find money to underwrite this. It is an expensive proposition when it comes to moving a lot of people and paying for their transportation and their keep en route. The estimated cost was about a half million dollars for this one trip. In the course of the day I could not secure funds. I approached the White House and got an allocation of \$300,000 or so much as might be necessary to defray the expenses on the part of the United States, which would be one-half. Unfortunately, although we had the money and were ready, the project could not be accomplished because the German Government, in the last analysis, got wind of it and stopped the movement of ships and told the Rumanian Government she was not to be a party to any such movement.

Then there was a joint warning with Great Britain, through the Swiss Government, to Balkan authorities against the mistreatment of the people under Nazi oppression. I wish I had that document with me so that I might read it to you. I think it is the strongest one that the State Department ever sent.

The CHAIRMAN. You might put it into the record.

Mr. LONG. No; I understand that we cannot put it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you wished you had it here, and I was wishing that we had it.

Mr. LONG. But it was without effect. Telegrams sent to these people are not going to be given any attention.

Then there is the offer of assistance to Sweden in connection with her reception of Jews and other people from Denmark. We offered to do our part in making generous contributions, but she said she did not think it was necessary; she thought it was an obligation on the Swedish Government. She did not even want to receive contributions from the Danish Government in exile; that she would endeavor to advance all the costs necessary herself, and that some settlement could be made if any was deemed proper in the future.

There is a request for the International Red Cross to endeavor to investigate and report on Jewish atrocities in Poland, which has not been permitted by the German authorities. We have tried to get the Red Cross to act as an agent in order to get an authentic story, but

the German authorities have absolutely prevented the Red Cross from taking any steps concerning the activities going on in Poland.

There is maintenance, in cooperation with British authorities, of refugees in Spain and the provision of means for their evacuation by intercession with the Spanish Government. It is still going on and about to be completed.

Then there is the support of the plan for removing children temporarily from Axis-held territory to neutral countries in varying numbers up to a maximum of 100,000 for rehabilitation in those countries where they could get food and where we would put the food where the children could be nourished and brought back to something like a normal state of physical well being and, after they had been there for 2 or 3 months and had gotten strong, they would go back home and some other children would come in.

Then there is the agreement with the British Government to underwrite costs of approved refugee relief projects put forward by the intergovernmental committee. The British Government and ourselves will each underwrite half of that expense. It is expected that other member governments will make contributions toward these expenses.

Now that, briefly, is the picture of Europe as it was, the United States as it was, and the present activities in which we are now engaged and the instrumentality which we set up, which was done after very careful consideration and deliberation in the setting up of this intergovernmental committee and revitalizing it and amplifying it with funds and authority and everything we had to give it.

You are faced now with a resolution which "urges the creation by the President of a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the surviving Jewish people of Europe from extinction at the hands of Nazi Germany."

Everybody that I know, everybody in the Department of State, and everybody that I have come in contact with is interested, and a lot of them have been active in endeavoring to save the Jewish people from the terrorism of the Nazis.

The State Department has had from the beginning quite an organization, which has been the agency of the Government which has been in charge of it. Acting for the Secretary of State, I have been in supervisory control and direction of its movements. Under me, as advisers and assistants, are three gentlemen who serve more or less as a council—Mr. Brandt, Mr. Travers, and Mr. Reams.

Mr. Brandt is my executive assistant and is concerned with all the activities of my office.

Mr. Reams is in the European division and brings to the conferences an understanding of the political situations developing in Europe and the benefit of his advice generally concerning the European theater.

Mr. Travers is chief of the visa division which, from the beginning, has been active and which is the organized center of the Department of State through which all of these movements above enumerated have been carried on. That is, the visa division is large, well staffed, and competent, and has been the working nucleus, the working ganglia in the Department which has functioned and is part of the organization which is carried on.

In that division also is the machinery for examining and screening the persons who come into the United States. They originate abroad and they come out of the same situation as the refugees abroad. So, naturally, it has been part of the same movement in two different sections of the Visa Division: one concerning refugees abroad and one concerning immigrants entering into this country.

That organization has been functioning, now, for 4 years and it has been very active in each of the phases of all this movement.

I have described the Intergovernmental Committee and the way in which it was set up and the fact that neutrals might not be induced to join a new movement the activities of which would be directed against what Germany would consider to be its interests.

There has been an agency of the American Government actually attending to these affairs for a little more than 4 years. There is now an international agency set up at the instigation and cooperating with the United States Government; and I think your committee will desire to consider whether any step you might take would be construed as a repudiation of the acts of the executive branch of your own Government, or whether any action on your part would be interpreted as a repudiation of the cause of the Jews—which would be very unfortunate or whether the action which you might take would constitute a reflection upon the actions of the Intergovernmental body and the other governments, members of that body, which have been associated with the American Government in its activities and which are currently very actively engaged in these matters. I think you will have very pointedly to consider that the Jewish people are entitled to every encouragement and expression of sympathy, and that you certainly would not care to make a statement, or pass a resolution, now that one has been introduced, that would fail to include some very definite statement about the interest of the American Government in the Jews, because the Government has been interested in them. They have not been the only refugees we have been interested in. We have been interested in refugees; and I think there has been some indisposition on the part of some officers to accept the thought that the American Government ought to specialize and make it particularly direct that we are interested only in the Jews. We have felt from the start that we could not exclude other persons from our governmental and official activities.

I have thought many times of the very definite and pertinent fact that there is no man or woman in this room that I know of whose ancestors were not refugees. Mine were, every one of them. So far as I know, the ancestors of almost all of my friends came here because conditions abroad, and some of them were conditions of persecution—some from France, some from Sweden, some from England, Scotland, and Ireland. I know that a great many Germans came here after the movement of 1848, and their descendents are some of the very best citizens that we have here. We all run back, sooner or later, by nearer or farther degree, to a refugee who was our original ancestor; and nobody can think of the United States except as being a government composed of the descendents of refugees and interested in saving those who are in danger of their lives or their liberties because of religious, racial, or political persecution.

Members of the committee, I think I should bring my statement to a close and leave it on that basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Long, I do not think you have elaborated upon this resolution. I think the committee would like to hear more upon what is in your mind with reference to this resolution.

Mr. LONG. I think, Mr. Chairman, that is more or less for the committee. It is hardly for the Department of State or the executive branch of the Government. I think it is more or less a matter for the decision of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson?

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your very full and fair statement covering the period in which you were connected with the State Department and looking after the refugee problems, and I must say that I have been very much impressed and have learned a great many things that I did not really know the Government had been doing. Personally, I want to express my appreciation and approval of what you have tried to do as a representative of the Government in connection with these very trying and difficult problems. I think I have now in my own mind a better conception of just what has been done than I ever had before.

I can understand that publicity of any kind with reference to many of the phases of the matter you have discussed would hinder rather than help the solution of the problem.

Mr. LONG. That is correct.

Mr. JOHNSON. This resolution recommends and urges the creation by the President of a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the surviving Jewish people of Europe from extinction at the hands of Nazi Germany. In other words, another agency of that kind created by virtue of the resolution would be a duplication of measures that are already functioning and have been for several years?

Mr. LONG. That agency has been functioning for over 5 years. It has been functioning now on a broader basis for perhaps 6 months. It has been set up and is today functioning.

Mr. JOHNSON. The creation, then, of another agency would simply be an overlapping or duplication of the powers and the functions now being exercised by the Intergovernmental Committee. That was first set up when?

Mr. LONG. It was first set up in 1938, at the call of President Roosevelt. It was attended reluctantly by some of the other governments, and Mr. Myron Taylor was able, by virtue of his persistent ability, if I may describe it as such—and it is a fairly good description—by virtue of his ability he arranged that there be some agreement and transferred the meeting to London and got the heads of the British Government to cooperate.

Mr. JOHNSON. That agency has been set up and has been going for 5 years?

Mr. LONG. Over 5 years, now.

Mr. JOHNSON. And that joint committee is trying to do the very thing that this resolution would direct this new commission to do; is that right?

Mr. LONG. I do not know what the resolution would direct the commission to do.

Mr. JOHNSON. It is stated in the language of the resolution.

Mr. LONG. But we are trying to do everything we can, and we did, within the territory of Germany, take all kinds of steps that were

possible to take while we had diplomatic representatives and consular representatives within German territory, but when we got into a state of war with Germany, and prior to the state of war, when they excluded our consular officers, we were unable to carry on that function in Germany. We have been trying to get back into Germany since, but have not yet succeeded. I hope the day will be soon.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that most of the witnesses who appeared in support of this resolution have agreed that the specific thing that they think might be accomplished by the resolution would be to find places for the Jewish and other refugees to go. They say that they think it is possible for refugees to escape from Germany and the occupied countries if they had any place to go. So they seem to think that if this new commission should be set up it would be able to get countries to say, "You can come here and we will give you a place to come."

This joint committee has been doing that very thing, has it not?

Mr. LONG. Yes; and the United States Government, incidentally, and its representatives on that committee.

Mr. JOHNSON. So, if we had a new commission set up there would simply be two committees trying to do one and the same thing? Am I right in that conclusion?

Mr. LONG. I do not like to state that categorically, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. I see your position. Your position is that we would want you to give this committee all of the facts in reference to what has been done and what is now being done, and then let the committee draw its own conclusion. In other words, you do not like, as a representative of the State Department, to tell this committee what you think ought to be done; you want us to exercise our own independent judgment. Is that right?

Mr. LONG. I will say this, Mr. Johnson, that the State Department has always been, during the 4 years I have been connected with the matter, and is today ready to receive any suggestion from the Congress, from any Member of the Congress, or from any interested public official, and we will do the best we can to carry out any suggestion that is feasible.

Along the line of that thought may I read the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee?

Mr. JOHNSON. I wish you would.

Mr. LONG (reading):

The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral or allied states or organizations and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain, and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion, or political beliefs. The operation of the Committee shall extend to all countries from which refugees come, as a result of the war in Europe, or in which they may find refuge. The Executive Committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse, for the purposes enumerated above, funds both public and private.

In other words, they are given plenary authority to do whatever they can, within and without Germany and the occupied territories.

Mr. JOHNSON. I believe that is all I care to ask, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chipfield?

Mr. CHIPFIELD. Mr. Long, I want to compliment you on your statement. I think you have done a splendid job, and I think you

are doing everything that can be done. From the testimony which you have given, it is obvious to me that a great deal of the negotiations must be secret, because, as you stated, there was one movement out of Germany that the Germans learned of, and then it was not successful. Under those circumstances, if we were to vote this resolution down, I wonder if the statement that we might give out to the press should be very carefully drawn, and I am wondering if it would be within your province, if this committee did draw up some kind of a statement and asked for your approval, for you to give it to us.

Mr. LONG. I think it would be very dangerous to vote it down, very unwise, in a way. It is on the table, and receiving the consideration of the members of the committee. I think this is a very important moment in the history of this refugee movement, and I think the Jewish people are looking forward to this action and the decision of the committee, and I think that if entirely negative action were taken here it would be misconstrued and might react against the Jewish people under German control.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I certainly would not want that to happen. Is it your suggestion that we pass the resolution?

Mr. LONG. I am glad to give my advice and counsel, but I hesitate to assume the responsibilities devolving upon the committee in its deliberations.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. We all want to be helpful.

Mr. LONG. Yes; I am sure of that.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. It is simply a matter of the best way to accomplish the result.

Mr. LONG. You may come to that decision in your deliberations. If you are finished with me, I should be glad if you would allow me to retire.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Burgin?

Mr. BURGIN. I do not know that I have any questions. I want to tell the Secretary, of course, how I appreciate his coming here and telling the committee about his activities in connection with this matter. I did have in mind asking you if you thought it would be advisable or necessary to pass a resolution that would implement your efforts.

Mr. LONG. I will have to leave that to the committee. I can tell you what the circumstances are and what the history of the movement has been and how we have participated and how we have organized to handle the situation, but I must allow the committee to draw its own conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Secretary, after hearing your statement I am not very much disposed to take any action which would be in the nature of saying, "Call a policeman," or that I would simply say to the President and the Secretary of State, "Why don't you do something about this?"

There are two things I wondered about. Possibly you have covered them in your earlier statement. One was that we have before us another resolution urging action with reference to feeding of children with an attempt to have this committee and the Congress make a gesture toward breaking the blockade to that extent.

Would you care to give us your view on that?

Mr. LONG. Yes; I would be very glad to, Mr. Vorys. The fact is that those matters, in the last analysis, were decided by the blockade authorities, and there has been imposed an absolute prohibition against the importation of bulk foodstuffs into occupied territory through the blockade. They have permitted and we have permitted and encouraged the purchase of foodstuffs within the blockade for distribution in Turkey, Spain, and Portugal; and we have even generously construed Portugal as being within the blockade, to include sardines and other fish which she goes out of the blockade to catch. But we have considered that as within the blockade, and not penetrating the blockade. This goes only to neutral countries or to Red Cross agencies. The neutral countries get allowances further under the Board of Economic Warfare's negotiations carried on under the supervision of the Department of State on economic matters, and they are allowed to import and to buy in exchange for certain exports and certain political actions certain quantities of food and material to carry along their economic life.

As regards the Red Cross activities, the importations consist of food and clothing. The food is in the form that goes to prisoners of war and consists of packages of about 11 pounds weight, of which every American soldier gets one package per week. It consists of concentrated foods and one thing and another, and there are great warehouses and places where we reserve supplies shipped in advance so that they will always be allowed to have it, both in Switzerland and in Sweden, and they are actually delivered to the persons for whom they are intended and receipts are received. Clothing goes to prisoners of war and to our allied prisoners of war. We have allowed our allies under lend-lease and by direct purchase clothing, which the Board of Economic Warfare has permitted. The clothes have to be marked and made distinguishable. They are not military uniforms, but stripes are woven into the material so that the Germans cannot get and use the things. They include caps, coats, underclothes, pants, shoes, and also medical supplies. For instance, there is just now being sent to France 20,000,000 units of insulin for distribution to the people in France, the general population.

Mr. VORYS. We have been told that the Germans would be willing to relax the blockade sufficiently to permit food for children to go through. There have been experiments which show that this food would go through and get to the children and not get to the Germans and would not be a substitute for German food. But while the blockade is on it cannot be done, which sounds like an extremely harsh view.

Mr. LONG. The blockade authorities, Mr. Vorys, have two points of view in mind. The first is the fact that if you send a week's supply of food, and supply it each week to a family in Antwerp, the German Government uses the food that the family would otherwise use; and irrespective of whether this food reaches that family, it is a contribution to the welfare and the fighting strength of the German Army, because that much food is released for the German Army.

The second is that we have tried time and again to get the consent of the German Government to have an organization go into it and have direction and control of the articles in question, and we have not

succeeded in obtaining the consent of the German Government, excepting in certain matters of the Red Cross under the Geneva Convention. Everybody except the Japanese were parties. I think the Russian Government was not a party either.

Mr. VORYS. One further question. Two or three of the witnesses have stated to the committee that either the direct or the ultimate purpose of this resolution is to open Palestine to the Jews.

Mr. LONG. I do not consider it as concerned with the Palestine question.

Mr. VORYS. Some of the witnesses have said they did not consider it as concerned with it. Others have said they considered it as concerned with that question; and one said it was the only solution to any commission which would be created. So we have had a good bit of discussion about that matter before us. Would you care to give us the facts as to that situation?

Mr. LONG. I cannot give you the facts; I can only give you my own reaction. I have not heard that point of view expressed, and the thought had never occurred to me that it had any relation to Palestine except that incidentally persons who were going out of Africa might go to Palestine if there was opportunity; and I understand there is continuing opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a letter from the British Government saying that it is a continuing opportunity. The British Government wrote me a letter to that effect. I will read it afterward to the committee.

Mr. LONG. I am glad that Mr. Bloom is able to make that statement. Heretofore the Department of State has been unable to talk about it.

Mr. VORYS. One witness said that what was necessary was to break down any of the regulations which were preventing any of the 4,000,000 Jews of Europe that could get away from getting into Palestine, and that therefore that was what we should follow up in this resolution. Other witnesses disagreed entirely with that. But that matter was injected into the hearings on this resolution very vehemently by two or three of the witnesses.

Mr. WADSWORTH. May I interrupt there?

Mr. VORYS. Certainly.

Mr. WADSWORTH. That is emphasized in a page advertisement in the New York Times.

Mr. ROGERS. This resolution was specifically drawn up to eliminate Palestine. Any time that you inject that into the refugee situation it reacts to the harm of the refugees.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the clerk read a letter received today by me from the British Embassy.

The Clerk [reading]:

Hon. SOL BLOOM,

*Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. CONGRESSMAN: You may recollect telephoning to me on November 12 about the position which the British Government has taken to permit Jewish immigration into Palestine after the end of the White Paper period, if the quota is not filled up then, as it probably will not be. The substance of the conversation was telephoned to Mr. Law who has asked me to thank you for your kind message. He would see no objection at all to your telling your friends that you did raise this point during the general discussion on Palestine assistance to refugees which was

held during the Bermuda Conference, and that you had ascertained that the question was already receiving attention from the British authorities concerned.

Mr. Law asks me to give you his most friendly greetings.

The CHAIRMAN. The British Parliament has already acted upon this and has extended the time of the thirty-odd thousand that are permitted to enter Palestine according to the white paper, which expires on March 31, 1944. They have extended the time, so that any Jew that can present himself at Palestine up to thirty-odd thousand will be permitted at any time.

Mr. JOHNSON. What is the amount?

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is 34,000 under the white paper. There were 75,000 permitted to enter Palestine, and there are thirty-odd thousand remaining, I believe, or around that figure.

Mr. JOHNSON. The quota is not filled?

The CHAIRMAN. No. But in answer to Mr. Rogers and Mr. Wadsworth, we have a copy of the advertisement that was in the New York Times the other day, and also in the New York Sun, and that question was specifically mentioned in the advertisement.

Mr. VORYS. If I could bring my question back before the Secretary: Of course, this resolution does not exclude such action as the advertisement and the three witnesses have stated it included. We have had three witnesses and a lot of advertisements arguing not for a continuation of the white paper quota, but arguing that this committee should go into the matter of creating a Jewish home in Palestine; and one witness said that if this commission were created of course he and his colleagues would expect immediately to bring pressure on the new commission to take action toward creating a Jewish home in Palestine.

I wondered whether you could give us any of the diplomatic or military situation which might be involved if such activities were started.

Mr. LONG. I cannot add much to what your knowledge already is, if I can add anything. Of course you realize that Palestine is operated under a mandate of the League of Nations granted to the British Government and that we were not parties to the authority which created the mandate. We made a treaty subsequently with Great Britain so as to give us a right under the mandate to protect the rights of American citizens in Palestine. But the question of Palestine has a larger significance than just the authority which created it, and we have always been interested, and I think Mr. Bloom's communication this morning constitutes additional evidence of the fact that the American Government is not entirely obtuse about Palestine or is not disinterested in the situation that is developing there. We have been interested and we will continue to be interested from the point of view of the larger aspects of world security and of world peace, as well as the rights of humans and humanitarian sympathies and the religious sentiments involved.

Mr. VORYS. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Secretary, I join with the other members of the committee who have previously thanked you for your splendid statement which you have made, and I agree wholeheartedly.

Some witness here made the statement that one of the difficulties in regard to the rescue of these Jewish people is because some of the countries, practically all the countries contiguous to the Nazi-

dominated territories, have the same prejudice against Jews, to a certain extent, that the Germans have, and that for this reason they are not so sympathetic toward any attempt to rescue the Jewish people. In other words, we tried to leave the impression with the committee that the Jews were entitled to separate treatment and special efforts on our part because this prejudice against the Jews is not only in the Nazi-dominated countries, but in other countries, and that therefore they are not given as much kindly treatment and not as much effort has been put forth to rescue the Jews as has been put forth to rescue refugees of other religions and nationalities.

Have you in your experience come across anything like that, or any attitude like that?

Mr. LONG. No, Judge. I have not seen any evidence of any prejudice in any of the neutral states in Europe or in any of the governments outside of the satellites of the Axis authority. Hungary has acted, I must say, generously, compared with its satellite associates, toward the Jews. Rumania has been very bitter. Bulgaria has responded to the whip of Germany; and Germany itself forced Italy into anti-Jewish activity. But except for the German Government and the sphere of its immediate powerful influence over governments within its Axis framework, I have seen no evidence of actual antipathy or opposition. We have had sincere cooperation at every turn—with the Swiss Government, the Swedish Government, the Spanish Government, the Portuguese Government, and the Government of Turkey.

As regards Turkey, I will simply make the statement that in some of the early negotiations we were trying to get the Jews out of Rumania into Palestine by rail instead of by the boats. The Turkish Government took the position that these people could go in transit through that small part of Turkey which lies between the Straits and Bulgaria. It would give them access to Istanbul, and that was the way we happened to get into this kind of transportation; but finally the German Government heard about it and interfered and prevented it.

The answer to your question, in short, is "No."

Mr. EBERHARTER. If a commission were formed, Mr. Secretary, any intended action they had in mind would necessarily, for practical purposes, be kept secret, the same as the actions of the Intergovernmental Committee?

Mr. LONG. That I do not know.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If they were to be effective?

Mr. LONG. If there was another committee I would not know what methods it would use.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If a commission were formed under this resolution do you think they could act alone and independently of your Intergovernmental Committee?

Mr. LONG. It might; I do not know.

Mr. EBERHARTER. From the very nature of things, do you not think, Mr. Secretary, that the new commission would probably get in contact with the Intergovernmental Committee and want to cooperate with them and advise with them, and perhaps it would end in embarrassment and annoyance in connection with the actions of the Intergovernmental Committee?

Mr. LONG. I am not prepared to say that I do, Judge. I do not know. It would depend upon the course of action which the Commission would follow.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, Mr. Richards. I did not notice you sitting down there. I will call on you after Mr. Stearns.

Mr. RICHARDS. I just wanted to say to the Secretary that I think every member of this committee fully realizes the difficulties that the Intergovernmental Committee has been operating under, and has every confidence in the action that has been taken so far. I do not have any questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stearns?

Mr. STEARNS. I am very grateful to the Secretary for his statement. I have been more or less in touch since the Special Division was set up, but I have never had such a good picture before as has been given to us today, and I am very grateful for it.

There is just one question that I would like to have cleared up in my own mind. You stated that you felt that the neutral governments would not want to cooperate in going into a new organization. Do I understand that the neutral governments are now cooperating definitely?

Mr. LONG. Oh, yes. I have read the list of them here.

Mr. STEARNS. I mean, when new measures are being proposed they are continuing to cooperate?

Mr. LONG. They are.

Mr. STEARNS. That is all I wanted to know.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gordon?

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Secretary, I am very grateful for hearing your statement. I have one question, however. You mentioned that some 8,000 refugees were shipped into the northern part of Africa. Does that include just the one race, Jews? Are there not Poles going into the northern section of Africa?

Mr. LONG. Into north Africa, from Spain?

Mr. GORDON. Yes.

Mr. LONG. It includes portions of all categories. It was more than 8,000. I think it was close to thirty-odd thousand. A great many were Jewish people, but they were not the stateless variety of Jewish people whom it is very difficult to move because of passport regulations and one thing and another; and it was that category, of which 1,200 remain. A number of them have come to the United States, about 600. England has given 600 of them visas for Palestine of the 1,200 who still remain. Even after the 600 visas for Palestine were taken out there were still about 600 of them, and provision has now been made to take care of 1,200 temporarily in north Africa; but the whole number in north Africa is above 8,000.

Mr. GORDON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mundt?

Mr. MUNDT. Like the other members of the committee I thoroughly appreciate your testimony, and I think it has given a rather complete rejoinder to the implications by earlier witnesses that the Bermuda Conference was ineffectual in that nothing is being done by the Government to solve this very troublesome problem concerning the Jews.

I have a series of questions, most of which I think you can answer rather briefly, but all of which, at least to me, are of importance.

You used two different figures about the number of Jews that have come into this country. I think you said 580,000 had been taken in in total, and then you used the figure of 145,000.

Mr. LONG. 135,000 refugees came in 1 year, one 12-month period. That was in the fiscal year 1942. The other was the 10-year over-all figure.

Mr. MUNDT. In arriving at those figures and discussing them you used two different terms. You said that the quotas of these various nations had been filled and then you also spoke about some coming in under temporary visas. Of the total of 580,000 how many have come in as permanent entries under quotas and how many have come in under temporary visas?

Mr. LONG. Most of them came in under the quota; and in that 1 year that I have mentioned in which the 135,000 came in we used all the quota visas for that area during that year, but that was inadequate to meet the situation, and then during the period mentioned we issued visitors' and transit visas, which would probably cover 85,000. The difference is between the quota limitation and the actual entries into the United States, which was about 135,000. In other words, 85,000 to 90,000, or somewhere along there. I can say only roughly.

Mr. MUNDT. Under the terms of those temporary visas it is quite possible that if the war runs along the visas terminate. Then what happens?

Mr. LONG. They are here illegally after a certain period and are deportable. During the period many of them will probably take advantage of an opportunity to apply for a change of status and reenter the country as permanent immigrants under the quota. They will have to leave the United States and go somewhere else. A number of them have taken advantage of that opportunity. They have gone to Canada, Mexico, and Cuba and have applied for reentry to the United States. The purpose of it, Mr. Congressman, was, in an emergency that was unparalleled in history, to save the lives of human beings. Many of these human beings were brilliant, able leaders of thought. Some were not considered anti-Fascist, but were persecuted. There were literary people and leaders of thought and religious movements and cultural movements; professors in universities, doctors. There were not only the educated leader type, but a lot of people who were just plain human beings and were going to be shot because they had engaged in some kind of an activity, or because of their religious beliefs.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like, for the benefit of Mr. Mundt and the committee, to say that when they come here as visitors and reapply to become immigrants or to be here permanently, they would have to make an application, and that is tried by the Interdepartmental Committee, and if the Interdepartmental Committee finds that they cannot pass all the requirements, after investigation by five members of each committee, State, War, Navy, and Intelligence, then if they are granted an application to reapply they must come in under the quota. None of these people come in permanently as immigrants.

Mr. LONG. You are right.

The CHAIRMAN. They must come in here, and then in order to go—

Mr. LONG (interposing). They would be given a temporary refuge. The CHAIRMAN. And then they can come back as immigrants.

Mr. LONG. They might go to Mexico for the duration of the war, and then go on home. They are here as temporary persons.

Mr. MUNDT. How often can their stay be extended?

Mr. LONG. It has to be actually extended, and it is always within the discretion of the Government to refuse additional extension, at which time the person becomes illegally here.

Mr. MUNDT. You stated that the Nazi Army within the last 6 months had gone into Poland and shot down people and killed them off and had stolen their homes and houses. Is that shooting and killing limited to Jews only?

Mr. LONG. No. They were not Jews at all. They were Polish citizens who were non-Jewish. That information was given to us formally by the Polish Ambassador.

Mr. MUNDT. Does the fact that Russia is not on this Intergovernmental Committee serve as a handicap in any way to the successful escape and evacuation of Jews trapped in Nazi countries?

Mr. LONG. No. Russia has been cooperating with us, long before there was an Intergovernmental Committee, and it was partly through her collaboration that people came over the Caucasus Mountains, and she has made homes for them and has really treated them very well. Of course there have been limitations upon Russia's ability to treat them with the same hospitality as other countries. She has been engaged in terrible experiences during most of the course of this hegira, but she has been receptive to them and has offered them such hospitality as she was able to give.

Mr. MUNDT. In the beginning of the war there was a large number of political refugees in France. What happened to them?

Mr. LONG. It is hard to say. A good many of them have got over into Africa. A good many have gone into Mexico.

Mr. MUNDT. Are there any manifestations of anti-Semitism in Spain?

Mr. LONG. I do not know what the attitude of that Government is; but their cooperation with us has been, I would say, very generous, I think. Maybe that is the wrong word, but they have collaborated and permitted the entry into Spain and their residence in Spain under assurances that we were trying to take them somewhere else.

Mr. MUNDT. I think you said you felt that it was the policy of the Intergovernmental Committee that all of these Jewish refugees who are finding temporary havens in north Africa, Mexico, and here and elsewhere should be returned to their homelands after the war; and you were quite emphatic about that, I believe.

Mr. LONG. No; I say they should have the right to return to their homelands after the war.

Mr. MUNDT. The thing I was speaking about was this, that after the war, after a lot of people's minds have been poisoned, I do not think you have solved the Jewish question if it came to the reason why these Palestine movements have gotten into these hearings to the extent they have. There has to be some community acceptance, and it is going to be pretty hard by a treaty of peace to return them and say, "Treat them right," because there are many ways that you can discriminate against them in peacetimes.

Mr. LONG. I quite agree, Mr. Congressman; but my remarks were directed only to giving these people the right to return to their homes in case they wanted to return.

Mr. MUNDT. With respect to the question of feeding 60,000 refugees in Switzerland, the question comes to my mind, how are we going to get the food in? You say the President has made money available, and so forth. Is he going to get the food in through the blockade, or does it have to be bought from inside?

Mr. LONG. It has to go through the blockade. We have a written arrangement with Switzerland to implement our food supply. She manufactures things which will come out to us, and we give such things as her economies demand for her economic satisfaction and operation. We get the consent of the blockading authorities, but they are well guarded.

Mr. MUNDT. One witness before the committee this week made the categorical statement that one of the benefits to come from this resolution would be that Jewish refugees leaving Europe would then be permitted to have transit through Turkey. He said specifically that the Turks were turning them back at the border. I am sure from your testimony that that is not correct.

Mr. LONG. I make the categorical statement on the direct evidence of our Ambassador who was here recently, and he said that he had direct, first-hand knowledge. He had himself been to the border between Bulgaria and Turkey and that he had seen on the other side of the border Bulgarian troops alternated with German troops, and they were guarding the border and preventing the ingress and egress. It was not the Turkish Government. One of the gentlemen who had been interested on the part of one of the groups asked for permission to go to Turkey, to verify this statement and I granted him the right to have a passport. Whether or not he has availed himself of it I do not know. But they selected a gentleman in New York, a vice president of one of the big department stores in New York, and we gave him the right to go to Turkey and make his own investigation and return and report to the people here.

We have several other persons in Turkey, representatives of these organizations, and they have all applied to us to send representatives to each of these places, but we have thought it was inadvisable to be too free in granting them, because they are not always in entire accord with the purposes of the policy. I have urged them to get together to have some common understanding and to select a common agent. If that should be done it would facilitate their troubles as much as possible provided the military authorities would consent to activities behind the lines. That is the only bar I have met. We have to submit to General Eisenhower anything that goes into the Mediterranean area.

Mr. MUNDT. Then the statement that the witness made was untrue?

Mr. LONG. It was an incorrect statement. I say that on the basis of my direct information from Mr. Steinhardt, our Ambassador, and he has discussed this question with me quite recently on two or three occasions during his recent visit in the United States.

Of interest along that line I might state two things. It has been proposed that the Intergovernmental Committee establish agencies of its own abroad and we have sent that proposal to the Intergovernmental Committee with our endorsement that they do so, which will bring the direct ganglia of this organization into wider fields.

Mr. MUNDT. Another statement made by a witness before the committee this week, of which I was somewhat skeptical, was this. He said that this resolution was necessary in order to force the admission of the Jews to Palestine after they had escaped from Europe, and the Chairman and he had some controversy about that. But he said there was a shipload of Jews from Turkey to Palestine that had been turned back, and after they were turned back the ship struck a mine or was hit by a torpedo, and all on board were murdered. Do you have any record of that?

Mr. LONG. There was a ship in 1941 which approached Istanbul. I do not know whether it ever got there or not. The boat was rerouted back, and something happened in the Black Sea, and I think the boat was destroyed and there was only one survivor.

Mr. MUNDT. Why was it turned back?

Mr. LONG. I do not remember now all the details of it. I could look it up, Mr. Mundt, and have you advised. It never passed Istanbul.

Mr. MUNDT. The chances are the boat was turned back?

Mr. LONG. It never got to Palestine. It never got through the straits.

Mr. MUNDT. Was the boat simply trying to get to Palestine?

Mr. LONG. It was trying to get out of the Black Sea through the straits, the Dardanelles.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, the failure of the boat to arrive safely at some port was in no way due to the failure of the Intergovernmental Committee?

Mr. LONG. No; it was before the United States got into the war and before the Intergovernmental Committee was very active. The boat was blown up in the Black Sea, east of the Dardanelles. It was a terrible thing to happen, but it was one of those things that do happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you explain for the benefit of Mr. Mundt and the committee the geographical location, so that we will all have an idea of it?

Mr. LONG. The Dardanelles separate Turkey into two parts, one very small part in which Istanbul is located. The other portion of Turkey is in the continent of Asia. Turkey retains jurisdiction over those straits. She owns both sides of them.

Mr. MUNDT. The witness led us to believe that a commission such as would be formed by this resolution would prevent that kind of thing. I do not see how it possibly could.

Mr. LONG. It could not prevent a boat hitting a mine or a hostile submarine from shooting it. The boat exploded; I do not think anybody knows why. I remember the incident. There may be other incidents that I do not know about, but I do remember that one.

Mr. MUNDT. With reference to the negotiations which have so far failed, but which I believe one of your associates said are still going

on in an effort to have 100,000 children rehabilitated by taking them to neutral countries, namely, Switzerland and others, and to feed them and treat them well for 2 or 3 months and then return them back to occupied Europe, are those 100,000 children to be selected exclusively from Jews, or are they to include children who are French and Dutch, for instance?

Mr. LONG. They are children of all groups and nationalities to be selected because of their physical condition. The Nazi children would not be included. It would not include German children. The Germans have taken food from those other countries and their children have it.

Mr. MUNDT. I appreciate your reticence in offering suggestions to the committee in connection with this resolution, and I think it is judicious. But we have got this hot poker on the table and we must dispose of it in the most diplomatic and effective manner. Simply to pass it as such, I infer from what you stated earlier, might be considered a criticism of the efforts which have been made to date, and simply to turn it down might be an implication to the Jews of Europe and this country that this committee is cold-hearted in its consideration of the problem.

I have in mind offering an amendment, Mr. Secretary, to this resolution, which would make it applicable to all refugees and persecuted peoples in groups, regardless of nationality, and I wondered if, from the standpoint of the State Department, you would find any objection to such a proposed amendment.

Mr. LONG. Mr. Mundt, the State Department has maintained that attitude all through, but the situation has come to a state of publicity today where I think the Jewish interests have emphasized the fate of the Jews as such; and while the Department has maintained all along the policy which you state, and, I think, must continue to maintain the policy, as far as the Department is concerned, unless the Congress directs otherwise—of course we will conform to whatever law Congress passes—the State Department's policy I think must be that we cannot exclude persons from our sympathy and our sympathetic attention if they are not Jews. I think we must treat all persons, irrespective of their race, religion, or political beliefs, in the same way; but I do think that the situation has arrived today, as evidenced by the fact that this committee is considering this matter formally, where something definite ought to be said concerning the Jews.

Mr. MUNDT. I gather from your very splendid discourse on what the committee has been doing that it has operated regardless of creed or religion, straight down the line, which I think is splendid. I have this conviction, Mr. Long, and if I am wrong I want to be straightened out on it. As a general policy for this country it is not good practice for us to establish a precedent, or if the precedent is already established, to emphasize it, whereby we pass legislation which singles out groups of people by their religion, or by their color or their faith, or their political affiliations, either for special consideration or for special penalty. It seems to me that that would be treading a pretty dangerous path. It is sort of doing the Hitler thing in reverse. The repercussions at home, at least, are bound to be insidious if we engage too much in that sort of thing. For that reason I have studied long

and studiously on this resolution to see whether it could not be couched in such language that it would avoid what I believe is a dangerous practice. If I am utterly wrong in that, I should be happy to bow to your more mature experience in that connection; but I would like to know why I am wrong, and have you explode my conviction if it is erroneous.

Mr. LONG. Mr. Mundt, I appreciate the compliment you pay me—

Mr. JOHNSON. But—

Mr. LONG. No, not "but." It is "and"—I appear here as an officer of the Department of State, appearing before your committee. If I were just Breckinridge Long you probably would not invite me to come up.

The CHAIRMAN. I would.

Mr. LONG. Well, I appear before you as an officer of the Department of State, and I belong to the executive branch of the Government. We do not try to tell the Congress of the United States what its policy should be. Congress fixes policy. Laws are the definition of policy.

Mr. MUNDT. But as a representative of the Government we are in the legislative branch, and we are not so far removed that we could not advise one another. We certainly welcome your counsel on a diplomatic question like this, which I think also has the possibilities of repercussions at home as well as abroad. We are all trying to do the thing that is best in this job.

Mr. LONG. I think I might repeat the words I used a little farther back, when I said I thought that this was a very serious moment in the history of the refugee movement, in the deliberations of your committee on this matter.

Mr. RICHARDS. Do you consider that the passage of this resolution would help the plight of the Jewish refugees? Do you think so personally?

Mr. LONG. That is a very difficult question to answer. I am sure the resolution was introduced with the intent of being of assistance. I am sure the Department of State has viewed this whole refugee problem from the point of view of being of assistance. I am sure that we all have the same thing in mind. It is only a question of instrumentalities to be used in effectuating the purposes of humanity. It is only a question of the choice of instrumentalities.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Mr. Mundt?

Mr. MUNDT. Not quite. We are approaching the termination of it. In work of this kind I think your Department and your committee has done a perfectly grand job. I am gratifyingly surprised in what you have accomplished, because witnesses had certainly led me up to now to think that Congress should step into the breach. It seems to me now that you are doing everything possible and feasible in that connection, and that the President's statement and Mr. Hull's statement in this document are vindicated by the evidence. It seems to me, also, that if the work is to continue successfully, the less we advise the Nazis about what our plans are the more likely we are to succeed. I wonder if you can see any possibility that the passage of a resolution of this kind and the establishment of a formal commission specifically instructed, as it has been in this resolution, to set up havens of refuge to aid people to escape from Europe, might not just serve as a sort of

advance notice to the Germans that if they intend to exterminate the Jews they better intensify their efforts and go right on with the job. It may rebound to the disadvantage of the Jew instead of to his advantage. Is there such a possibility?

Mr. LONG. That is one of the theories that you have to follow and eventually reach a decision. You must keep in mind the consequences of the action of this body.

Mr. MUNDT. Is it a plausible theory?

Mr. LONG. That I do not know. I would be very glad if I could say yes or no, Mr. Mundt. It might do good; it might do serious harm.

Mr. MUNDT. I have only one other question, and it is another attempt to get from you an evaluation of the situation.

After I had suggested in open committee at our last meeting that I intended offering such an amendment as I have discussed previously, a committee of people who had been witnesses here called upon me and said, "I wish you would not offer that amendment, for this reason. Every persecuted group in Europe today has an official body of representatives some place among the United Nations. There is a refugee government in Poland; there is a refugee government in Norway," and so forth and so forth. And they said, "The Jewish people have no official governmental body or refugee government representing them; and this resolution would establish an official Jewish representative body"—which, it seems to me, must imply that that group intends that this official body of Jewish representatives should function as a little refugee government would if it were Polish or Belgian or Norwegian, but must be tied in pretty definitely with the post-war problem as it relates to Palestine, because if it has official sanction and status, obviously its interest in the solution of the problem as an official representative body would not terminate with the war.

Would you care to say whether you think that it is important from the standpoint of solving the Jewish problem now and after the war for us to establish by congressional action and Presidential appointment an official Jewish representative body? Do you feel a need in your work for an official Jewish representative body with which to consult, which can speak for the Jews and the Jews alone, as the Polish Government speaks for the Poles and the Poles alone?

Mr. LONG. I would have to refer, first, to your premise.

Mr. MUNDT. It is not my premise; it is the premise of the committee.

Mr. LONG. The premise of the question that you just asked—that the Jews have nobody to represent them. I think that depends upon the desire of the individual. In America we look upon them as Americans. They have all the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizenship here. If a Jew with American nationality gets in trouble in any part of the world the Department of State goes after it and tries to do as much for him as for anybody else, no matter whether he is a Methodist or whatever else he may be. We look upon them as American citizens. There are a great many of them here. Some are members of our council. Some of them are in office in the Halls of Congress, in the executive departments of the Government, and in the judicial structure. We have no distinction in this country on account of religion or race. I cannot answer for other governments. I know there are a few persons who are not able to claim a government, a comparatively few, those who are called the

stateless Jews, who are deprived of their citizenship in the countries in which they live. However, those persons are being taken into other countries, and if they desire they can become a part of other countries and become citizens of other countries. They can here. They have an opportunity to be here just like anybody else is here, through regular and due processes of the law. They can become citizens of the United States as such, and even without being citizens of the United States they can confer with you and with me, with any member at this table, and they can make known their beliefs, their understandings, their desires. They can contribute to the formation of policy. They can contribute to the election of Members of Congress and make known their views through the representative system. I cannot answer for other governments, but I am sure that I speak the situation as it exists in this country.

Mr. MUNDT. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers?

Mr. ROGERS. I want to thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your statement. I came into this room rather recently, but I know some of the work that you have done. There has been an impression around that the State Department and the Intergovernmental Committee had not been active; and I think that that is false and fallacious. I think a statement such as you have just made, if it could be printed, and those parts which you feel could not be said openly, should be deleted, but some part of it could be known to the general public; it would do a great deal toward allaying fears. I think it is an excellent statement and an excellent record and one which you and this country should be proud of and one which, if you feel it can be said openly, should be published. I do not envy you your position. I know that it is very difficult. When people get frantic they go to all sorts of extremes. Their friends or relatives, they feel, are under the machine guns and they bring all sorts of pressure to bear. It seems to me you have been doing your best and the people here have certainly been doing their best; and it is unfortunate that pressure should exist between those that you are trying to save and people that are doing their utmost to save them.

I would like to correct a few impressions if I can about this resolution. It was introduced to be helpful. It is in no sense to be construed as being critical of past actions. It was simply that I and others felt that with the imminent collapse, we hope, of Germany the satellites would be more willing to cooperate now than they were before; that our prestige with the neutrals must be greater now than it was before; that there was a possibility for redoubled action, and a chance that if any request was made it would be thoroughly in keeping and in line with the idea that everything that had been done in the past was all that should have been done.

But now we have additional opportunity. It may be false, but it did appear to me that there was a chance for additional effort both to get people out and to take additional steps.

The work of the Intergovernmental Committee has been excellent. Of all that you have said I was most pleased, I would say, with the fact that they are going to establish offices and that there is hope or possibility of the establishment of offices. That has been one of the difficulties. We have never known in the past exactly where to go. There is no regular Intergovernmental Committee with an office, or

none that I know of. In England, when I was there, they were just beginning to set it up. I think if there was one particular place through which all these frantic efforts could be canalized, one place that you could show them, and if there were branch offices, it would be a great forward step.

About some of these questions, especially that Mr. Mundt spoke of, in my opinion—and I wish you would correct me if I am wrong—those are post-war problems. The Rehabilitation Commission is going to have a difficult task. One of their jobs is going to be the resettlement of the Jewish and non-Jewish. I do not envy them that job, but I do not think that is a function of the Intergovernmental Committee at all. Am I correct in that?

Mr. LONG. If the Rehabilitation Administration was not doing it the Intergovernmental Committee probably would.

Mr. ROGERS. But it is assumed that the Rehabilitation Administration will eventually take it over in the future, just as it was assumed and hoped that it would take over the function of this little commission. As I understand it, when a refugee has escaped he comes under the jurisdiction of the Intergovernmental Committee. If he gets across the border and the Intergovernmental Committee can help him, it will. If he happens to be a refugee a year or so after the war is over and he comes under the jurisdiction of the Rehabilitation Administration, the function of this Commission was to try to get him out before he would come under the normal jurisdiction or notice of the Intergovernmental Committee.

It may be that if the Intergovernmental Committee does set up these offices it can actually start to take such steps as we would envision with this Commission, and it may be that that might not be necessary if the Intergovernmental Committee will have sufficient authority and power to try and save people in advance of becoming refugees.

But another one of the difficulties in treating with the Jewish problem is that they are not exactly refugees; they are potential refugees, and it is difficult to deal with them because they are not yet outside of the country.

There are really no questions that I want to ask. I just thought that your statement was a fine and brilliant exposition of a very complicated subject, and I do commend for your consideration the thought of having a part of the story printed, certainly as regards the set-up of the different organizations. I think that would be most helpful.

I would like to again express the fact that this resolution is not in any sense critical of past actions. I do not think it should be interpreted as being critical of past actions. It was introduced with the idea of supplementing past actions at a time when we thought future action would be possibly more helpful than it would have been 6 months ago.

Do you feel that there is a better chance? Is this supposition correct, that as we get nearer to winning the war there is a better chance of getting people out?

Mr. LONG. There is no apparent disposition on the part of the German Government to let anybody out.

Mr. ROGERS. How about the satellite governments?

Mr. LONG. They are not permitted by the German army. German control is exercised throughout all those countries. They are not

independent agencies. I think we are all just as interested as we can be in seeing the quickest possible defeat of enemy powers, and everything we can possibly do to contribute to the defeat of the enemy powers as quickly as possible; but it is not until we do defeat those powers that you are going to exercise actual control over the people inside German jurisdictions, whether they be Jew or Gentile.

Mr. ROGERS. All this is just simply an interim hope.

One other question, sir, about Denmark and Sweden. Is it true that it was Sweden opening its doors that allowed those refugees to come in, or was it that the German pressure had increased so greatly in Denmark that they finally decided to leave?

Mr. LONG. The German Government took advantage of Denmark. Denmark had had, up to that time, a sort of fantastic Danish government which was subservient to the will of the German Government, and it more or less operated as a semi-autonomous state. Then the German Army suddenly took over Denmark, and the King was practically a prisoner; the parliament dissolved, and the German Government immediately started to institute against the population of that little country the same steps it had undertaken in Germany, and the Jews knew instantly that they were going to be singled out. So they started to fly. When they started to fly they had no advance notice from Sweden that they could come in, but instantly Sweden said, "Come in."

Mr. ROGERS. Did Sweden make that statement officially?

Mr. LONG. It made some communication to that effect, and Germany did not react very favorably. But it is only a short distance across from Denmark, and you can swim it if you are a good swimmer. But they have all kinds of boats. Some of the people were shot at and some were killed. Some of the boats were sunk in the sound, but most of them got out, all but a few hundred.

I asked the Swedish Minister to come down to the State Department, and he came within the hour. I said, "I would like to express to you the thanks of the American Government and its deep appreciation for the contribution you are making to the refugee cause in opening your doors to those poor people; and if there is anything that we can do to help, we will be very glad, if you will let us know how and what we can do."

He thanked me very much for the kindly expression and said he would immediately telegraph his government. He did telegraph his government, and they accepted that as an encouragement to go ahead, and they are continuing to let people come in. Almost 9,000 got out of Denmark. That action has been an encouragement to keep her going.

Switzerland has taken about 60,000 of these people. We have got to make some arrangement with Switzerland to uphold our share of the cost. But they are going to continue as long as this war lasts. There will not be great sums involved, but they will have to be sufficient to pay for certain actual costs.

Mr. ROGERS. Do any private contributions come to the Intergovernmental Committee?

Mr. LONG. They can. I will give you another incident. One of the Jewish agencies came to us the other day and said they would like to get a clearance from the Treasury to send some money over to Switzerland so that, under the instrumentality of the Intergovern-

mental Committee, they could have money there so that when the opportunity arose they could use it through the International Red Cross to buy food to take care of certain remnants of the Jewish populations in parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland; that there were still extant these remnants and they were going to starve unless they could leave, and would we be willing to endorse it? I said, "Of course." They said it would cost about \$10,000,000. I said, "All right; if you can get the project set up and go before the Intergovernmental Committee with the assurance that the International Red Cross can handle it, so that it does not fall into the hands of the German Government and the supplies sent in there will not be taken by the German Government we will be glad to approve it and to forward it as far as we can, and we will recommend it to the Treasury."

They wanted to put up \$2,000,000 and send a first amount of \$250,000. I asked them to make an application to the Treasury, which they have already done. We are supporting the application to the Treasury, so as to have money there in cases of necessity which the Intergovernmental Committee can approve. We have agreed to finance half of the cost. It would be \$4,000,000 for each government if we are required to spend as much as \$10,000,000—\$2,000,000 from the United States, \$4,000,000 underwritten by the American Government, and \$4,000,000 by the British Government to finance this project.

Mr. ROGERS. Is there any office of the Intergovernmental Committee any place other than in London?

Mr. LONG. No. That is the seat of the committee.

Mr. ROGERS. They have no branch office?

Mr. LONG. They have not up to now, but we have made that proposal to them.

Mr. ROGERS. How many members are there that are active on it? Just a few? I know there must be some.

Mr. LONG. There are 29 members that are active. The executive committee is composed of a smaller number. I might as well give you the names, just to show you that it is not a fly-by-night organization.

Myron Taylor is the American member. His alternate or substitute is the American Ambassador in London, Mr. Winant, who sits on the committee under the guidance of Mr. Taylor.

The Vice Director is Patrick Malin, an American citizen.

For Great Britain the member is Lord Winterton, and a director above Patrick Malin and cooperating with him is Sir Herbert Emerson.

For Argentina, the Argentine Ambassador, Señor Dr. Don Miguel Angel Carcano.

The Brazilian member of the executive committee, who is cooperating with us every day, is the Brazilian Ambassador, Señor J. J. Moniz de Aragao.

The French member of the executive committee is Maurice Dejean, representative in London of the French Committee of National Liberation.

The Netherlands member of the committee is the Netherlands Ambassador, Johnkheer E. Michiels van Verduyuen.

The director is Sir Herbert Emerson; the vice director is Mr. Patrick Malin; the honorary assistant director is Dr. Kullman (Swiss), and the secretary is Mr. Sillen (Dutch).

Mr. ROGERS. I think Mr. Malin is an excellent man and a very fine, high-class person. Is he the only paid person on the executive committee?

Mr. LONG. I am not sure of that. There are several others.

Mr. ROGERS. Just one last word about Switzerland. I have spoken to some people about Switzerland, and they felt that if it were possible to have a committee constantly in Switzerland it would be very very helpful. Switzerland has more refugees than she can afford. If we can give Switzerland the assurance that after the war these refugees will no longer be a burden on her, and if we had some committee to cooperate with her—

Mr. LONG (interposing). We are giving assurances to Switzerland, and did not only before the war, but during the war and offering her assistance. How are we going to send a committee into Switzerland?

Mr. ROGERS. You can fly in.

Mr. LONG. I do not think you can.

Mr. ROGERS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jonkman?

Mr. JONKMAN. I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your very fine, comprehensive statement. I want to say that it has only driven home a conviction which I have felt that this committee is on the horns of a dilemma that Mr. Mundt has referred to as a hot poker. Mr. Rogers tells us, and I believe him absolutely, that the Palestine question is in everyone's mind in connection with this resolution, and three witnesses who appeared before us apparently, from their testimony, did have it in mind. So I do not think we can get away from the fact, and I think you have intimated that, that if we pass this resolution we are putting a club in the hands of certain people to accomplish something that was not intended by the resolution.

Mr. LONG. I have not intimated that. I am sorry, but you are not attributing that to my statement, I hope?

Mr. JONKMAN. No, not that part, but the situation is there. I think it is also true, if you read the resolution, that while that also is disclaimed, it might be read as a repudiation or criticism of work that has already been done by the Administration. There are a number of things against the resolution, in my mind, and yet I think you also said that it would be difficult for us to turn it down, and with that I agree. I was inclined to go along with Mr. Mundt and see if we could not make it somewhat broader by taking in the other oppressed peoples. It seems to me that would in itself amount to a repudiation. Personally, I feel that what we need here is diplomacy, at which you and your associates are experts.

Suppose, under the second paragraph of the resolution, we say:

Whereas under the American tradition of justice and humanity, all possible means, under existing facilities, have been employed to save from this fate.

And then, as the last paragraph—

Resolved, That the House of Representatives recommends and urges the consideration of the creation by the President of a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the surviving Jewish people.

Do you think that would be acceptable to the State Department and to the administration?

Mr. LONG. I have not consulted my colleagues, but it seems to me it is simply putting the problem into the President's lap in a way which is just asking him to consider it.

Mr. VORYS. It is in a way.

Mr. JONKMAN. It seems to me that would meet the objection of those who are sincerely for this resolution, and it would seem to me it would not put the administration into an uncomfortable position. In other words, instead of recommending and urging the creation of a commission, we are recommending and urging the consideration of the creation of it.

Mr. LONG. It is a question for the committee. It is a legislative matter.

Mr. JONKMAN. I am aware of that, but I was just trying to get your reaction. I have only had one, and that was that we were passing the buck.

Mr. LONG. I did not use that language. But that would not be coming to a decision by this committee. Of course that is the status in which it has been all along up to this morning, when I have related to the members of the committee all of the history of the matter in brief. But the Department of State, acting under the direction of the President, has carried on this activity, and the movement has not come to the Congress heretofore. It has been purely a matter of administration activity. Now the attention of the Congress is focused upon another proposal, and it is a question of whether that proposal would be considered as a criticism or repudiation of all of the things which the Executive has done, or if it does not take the steps indicated in the resolution, will it somehow reflect upon our Jewish friends whom we have been trying to help, and making it more difficult for them by being practically a repudiation of their cause.

Mr. MUNDT. I can go along with your reasoning there, very well, Mr. Secretary, but the passage of the resolution in its present form, in conjunction with the hearings, would certainly lead critics of the administration and many impartially minded people to consider it an indictment or criticism or repudiation of the administration's efforts heretofore. I cannot follow the rest of the suggestion, however, that that being true, if we pass it or if we do not pass it, we are throwing cold water on the hopes of the Jewish people. I would think we could write into it some such language as that after hearing various witnesses, including the distinguished representative of the State Department now before us, the committee feels that the establishment of additional machinery is unnecessary, and everything feasible to be done is being done, and in that way there would be neither criticism of the administration nor throwing cold water on the hopes of those particularly interested in the problem.

Mr. LONG. I was not speaking from the political point of view. It was only the possible harm it might do to the persons who would be the beneficiaries.

Mr. MUNDT. If I thought it would be purely a matter of politics I would be for it a hundred percent.

Mr. LONG. I take it that the members of the committee can work something out in the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that that can be left to the committee in executive session.

Mr. Wadsworth?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I hope, Mr. Secretary, that we have not tired you out.

Mr. Alfange, the first witness in support of this resolution, in a carefully prepared statement read in a public hearing, made it perfectly plain that he regarded the failure of the Government of the United States in this field to be disgraceful. That was the general tenor of his remarks. I think the efforts of our Government are to be highly commended, and I am glad to hear the story.

Now, in respect to the alleged embarrassments, perhaps I do not take them quite as seriously as some other people; but let us assume that there are some embarrassments here. You read to the committee a few moments ago, Mr. Secretary, the terms of the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee. I think you took about a minute, did you not?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Will you read it again? It was the document which you denominated as the mandate.

Mr. LONG. That is part of the document which has been under the agreement with the British Government considered secret.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Will you read it again?

Mr. LONG. I will read from it [reading]:

The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral and Allied states and organizations and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain, and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion, or political beliefs. The operation of the committee shall extend to all countries from which refugees come as a result of the war in Europe or in which they may find refuge. The Executive Committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse for the purposes enumerated above funds both public and private.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Is that secret?

Mr. LONG. It is secret.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I regret it.

Mr. LONG. I am sorry that it is, and perhaps we can arrange to get it released. This new mandate is being circulated amongst the subscribing governments. We have agreed, the British have agreed.

Mr. WADSWORTH. If it is signed by a considerable number, a clear majority of the member governments, to me it is a complete answer to this whole problem, so far as the action of the Congress of the United States is concerned. It is a complete answer. Whether or not the executive branch of the Government and the representatives of other governments would believe that a thing of that sort should not be made public to the world, I do not know. I realize that a good deal of this work in rescuing these people must be under cover, in view of the ironclad obstinacy of the German Government where many people are doing their best to permit people to escape; but it must be a matter of common knowledge that there is an Intergovernmental Committee and it must be a matter of common knowledge that the only function of that Intergovernmental Committee is to help refugees. I think the expressions used in that mandate are so clear, so definite, so vigorous that, if made public it would bring reassurance and do away with all these embarrassments that we sit here and talk about.

Mr. LONG. Mr. Wadsworth, if it would comport with your idea I would be glad to initiate this afternoon, by telegram, the question of the release of this document to make it public as soon as we have agreement with the essential governments.

Mr. WADSWORTH. In my judgment, Mr. Secretary, such action, if it could be brought about, would clear this table, and our committee, in my humble judgment, could rest its case for failure to act affirmatively on any specific resolution upon the declaration which you have read to us.

Mr. LONG. The committee might paraphrase its understanding of the contents of the document.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. We might write a report which would be submitted to you and the appropriate officials of the State Department, and it might throw further light on this matter—

Mr. VORYS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. Certainly.

Mr. VORYS. It seems to me it would be a great pity if our embarrassment because of some resolution should require the making public of some statement which I can well see many good reasons for keeping secret. I can see repercussions in this country at the publication of this mandate which would not be altogether helpful. I can see many reasons why it has been far better to keep the deliberations and activities secret since the Bermuda Conference, in addition to military reasons, and I would question whether we would help those situations by urging the other governments to make public any statement at this time.

Mr. WADSWORTH. That is something that our own State Department and the other governments can decide for themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. I am a member of the Bermuda Conference, and the Secretary will bear me out in this. It was specifically understood down there that nothing should be given out by any government until it was agreed upon and given out simultaneously by the other governments.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we have to contend with. Nobody knows what the Bermuda Conference has done. I agree with Mr. Wadsworth that if that could go out, if that statement were made public, it would answer the entire question.

Mr. JOHNSON. It strikes me, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wadsworth has the floor.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I have nothing further.

Mr. JOHNSON. It strikes me that Mr. Wadsworth's position is sound, but I cannot agree with Mr. Vorys' suggestion that there might be adverse effects by giving publicity to this. That is based, of course, upon the assumption that Mr. Long can get permission to release it. I understand that all agreements that are pending are not released until the governments involved pass upon them.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Could not this committee draw the conclusion that powers had been given to this committee without making a quotation?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; that could be done. I wanted the country to know that the very purpose sought to be accomplished by the commission here proposed to be created is already being carried out by an agency of not only the United States but 31 other countries, and

that is the most effective way in which to deal with it. The very purpose of this mandate is to try to do the job by eliminating entirely the question of the necessity for legislation.

Mr. WADSWORTH. May I make one more statement. I can well understand your hesitancy in making any affirmative suggestions as to the wording of the resolution or the deletion of phrases. Obviously your hesitancy is well founded. But may I say to you that in our contacts with other representatives of the State Department there have been exchanges of views as to phraseology and expressions across the table in executive session, the representatives of the Department indicating that some of our suggestions were worthy of consideration and perhaps, in their judgment, subject to further study and should be inserted in the instrument. An outstanding case of that was a long conference around this table with Dean Acheson and Mr. Sayre, in which we were shown the then secret draft of the international agreement for relief and rehabilitation. We discussed nearly every sentence in it. We made certain suggestions. No votes were taken. Before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate a similar discussion was held, and many weeks afterward the final draft was agreed upon by the State Department and others interested, and it was brought to us and shown to us, and several of our recommendations had been incorporated, and it was going out to all nations for signature.

I cite that, Mr. Secretary, to indicate that this committee—and I am sure I am speaking the truth—is anxious to cooperate closely with you and the State Department.

Mr. LONG. That is what I like.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask the Secretary whether it is not correct that our State Department participated in the phrasing and wording of the mandate which he read at the suggestion of Mr. Wadsworth?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. I want to say, in connection with my proposed amendment and my series of questions to you, that I am highly gratified by the wording of that mandate, which it seems to me excludes entirely the things which I stated I had convictions about and feared as an American policy of singling out individual groups. It seems to me that that phraseology, that wording, completely covers all the subject matter of this resolution, and that there cannot be any possible adverse repercussions. I want to join with Mr. Wadsworth in saying that I hope you will initiate telegrams and see whether the other countries will agree to use the words and the phrases of that document. I entirely disagree with my good friend here that that could have any serious repercussions if they all agree to publish it. I think that is a perfect answer to the dilemma in which we all find ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. I knew that the members of the committee would be very glad if the Secretary could give a little information.

We thank you very much for appearing here, and I am very sorry that we have taken up so much of your time.


I also want to thank the gentlemen who came with you, Mr. Brandt, Mr. Travers, Mr. Reams, and Mr. Kuppinger. All of those gentlemen

are very much interested in this refugee problem. If you gentlemen do not know them you ought to go up and get acquainted with them.

Mr. LONG. I would like to thank the members of the committee for their long-suffering courtesy, and I would like you to feel, collectively and individually, that I am always at your service, and I would like to feel, as Mr. Wadsworth says, that we are on the same team.

(Whereupon, at 2:05 p. m., the committee adjourned subject to the call of the chairman.)

APPENDIX



RESCUE OF THE JEWISH AND OTHER PEOPLES IN NAZI- OCCUPIED TERRITORY

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

OCTOBER 30, 1942.

In commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of the Balfour Declaration by the British Government on November 2, 1917, a memorandum was presented to the Secretary of State by a group of rabbis. Secretary Hull observed that the Balfour Declaration had aroused wide attention in the United States, and that this country had followed with interest and sympathy the work which had been done under it, in which American citizens have played a useful part. He added:

This country was shocked and outraged when tyranny and barbarity again commenced their march, at the brutality which was inflicted on certain races, and particularly on the Jewish populations of Europe. Apparently no form of abuse has been too great, and no form of torture or oppression too vile, to be meted out to these populations by the Nazi despots. And, in taking this attitude towards the Jewish race, they have made it plain by concrete acts that a like attitude would be taken towards any other race against whom they might invent a grievance.

The Jews have long sought a refuge. I believe that we must have an even wider objective; we must have a world in which Jews, like every other race, are free to abide in peace and in honor.

We meet today when the battle for freedom is being carried on in the East and in the West and our every effort is concentrated on a successful issue. We can with confidence look forward to the victory when liberty shall lift the scourge of persecution and the might of the United Nations free mankind from the threat of oppression.

Of all the inhuman and tyrannical acts of Hitler and his Nazi lieutenants, their systematic persecution of the Jewish people—men, women, and children—is the most debased. The fate of these unhappy people must be ever before us in the efforts we are making today for the final victory; at the moment of triumph under the terms of the Atlantic Charter the United Nations will be prepared not only to redeem their hopes of a future world based upon freedom, equality, and justice, but to create a world in which such a tragedy will not again occur.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECEMBER 17, 1942.

The attention of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Greek, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslav Governments and also of the French National Committee has been drawn to numerous reports from Europe that the German authorities, not content with denying to persons of Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous rule has been

extended, the most elementary human rights, are now carrying into effect Hitler's oft-repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe. From all the occupied countries Jews are being transported in conditions of appalling horror and brutality to eastern Europe. In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German invader are being systematically emptied of all Jews except a few highly skilled workers required for war industries. None of those taken away is ever heard of again. The able-bodied are slowly worked to death in labor camps. The infirm are left to die of exposure and starvation or are deliberately massacred in mass executions. The number of victims of these bloody cruelties is reckoned in many hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women, and children.

The above-mentioned Governments and the French National Committee condemn in the strongest possible terms this bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination. They declare that such events can only strengthen the resolve of all freedom-loving peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite tyranny. They reaffirm their solemn resolution to insure that those responsible for these crimes shall not escape retribution and to press on with the necessary practical measures to this end.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 3, 1943.

The following is the text of a note delivered to the British Government by the Secretary of State on February 25, 1943:

FEBRUARY 25, 1943.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the British Embassy's aide memoire of January 20, 1943, relating to the situation of persons fleeing from persecution for religious, racial, and political reasons and to the necessity for intergovernmental relief action in their behalf.

It is evident that the problem of the refugees in question cannot be solved in a satisfactory manner by any one of the governments of the United Nations group nor of the neutral countries. It has been, and is, the traditional policy of this country to seek every available means by which to extend to oppressed and persecuted peoples such assistance as may be found to be feasible and possible under the laws of the United States. In pursuance of that policy, this Government has been and is taking steps to extend assistance in a large measure to those European people who have been subjected to oppression and persecution under the Hitler regime. The measures of assistance afforded have assumed several forms, as follows:

1. Joint and several declarations of official attitude of condemnation of the policies and acts of the Axis Governments and their satellites in oppression or persecution of religious, racial, and political minorities;
2. The appropriation and expenditure of large amounts of public and private funds for the relief of persons in need as a result of oppression and persecution because of their racial origin or religious or political beliefs;
3. The application of the immigration laws of the United States in the utmost liberal and humane spirit of those laws;

4. The calling by the President of the United States of the first Intergovernmental Conference at Evian-London in 1938 for the purpose of seeking a solution of refugee problems. There may be repeated here the statement made in that conference by the Honorable Myron Taylor on behalf of this Government, as follows:

In conclusion, I need not emphasize that the discrimination and pressure against minority groups and the disregard of elementary human rights are contrary to the principles of what we have come to regard as the accepted standards of civilization. We have heard from time to time of the disruptive consequences of the dumping of merchandise upon the world's economy. How much more disturbing is the forced and chaotic dumping of unfortunate peoples in large numbers. Racial and religious problems are, in consequence, rendered more acute in all parts of the world. Economic retaliation against the countries which are responsible for this condition is encouraged. The sentiment of international mistrust and suspicion is heightened, and fear, which is an important obstacle to general appeasement between nations, is accentuated.

The problem is no longer one of purely private concern. It is a problem for intergovernmental action. If the present currents of migration are permitted to continue to push anarchically upon the receiving states and if some governments are to continue to toss large sections of their populations lightly upon a distressed and unprepared world, then there is catastrophic human suffering ahead which can only result in general unrest and in general international strain which will not be conducive to the permanent appeasement to which all peoples earnestly aspire.

At the Evian-London Conference and through the intergovernmental committee which grew out of that conference, this Government exerted its most earnest efforts to persuade the various countries represented to provide asylum for as many refugees from the Axis countries as the laws of the several countries would permit. This Government has also approached other countries for the purpose of finding places of settlement for refugees with funds of the United States origin being made available.

5. As shown by the records of the Department of State, from the advent of the Hitler regime in 1933 until June 30, 1942, 547,775 visas were issued by American diplomatic and consular officers to natives or nationals of the various countries now dominated by the Axis Powers, the great majority of which persons were refugees from Nazi persecution. Of this number 228,964 were issued in the war years 1939-42. Many more than that number of visas were authorized during this latter period, the aliens in whose behalf such authorizations were given having been unable to depart from their places of foreign residence to reach the United States. Yet, of the number actually issued practically all of the aliens who received them during the war years 1939-42 have actually arrived in the United States and have remained here, many of them having entered in a temporary status and not yet having departed.

6. Over 5,000 visas were authorized for the admission into the United States and permanent residence here of refugee children coming from France, Spain, and Portugal under arrangements with certain private persons and organizations in the United States for their care. Visas were also authorized for the parents accompanying them, in certain cases. This Government has sought the friendly assistance of the Government of Switzerland to effect the release from France of such of these children who have not been permitted to leave France for entry into Spain where visas may be issued to them by the American consular officers.

7. Since the entry of the United States into the war, there have been no new restrictions placed by the Government of the United States upon the number of aliens of any nationality permitted to proceed to

this country under existing laws, except for the more intensive examination of aliens required for security reasons.

8. Considerable sums of money have been made available by the American Red Cross and from other American sources to the American Ambassador at Madrid for the care of refugees now in Spain pending their evacuation. A number of these refugees have already been removed to north Africa. The continuation of this movement and its extent are dependent upon military considerations.

9. The American Red Cross and other American organizations have provided assistance for refugees who have been able to reach other neutral countries, such as Iran, and have undertaken extended feeding among children, including refugee children, in France.

10. In evacuating refugees to neutral areas, the full influence of the United States diplomatic and consular representatives has been from time to time invoked, not only with the oppressor nations but with any government concerned, on behalf of the refugees.

This Government understands that, in addition to the refugee classes under immediate consideration, the British Government has certain undertakings for the care of British evacuees and of prisoners of war. Likewise, the Government of the United States has certain similar undertakings, as follows:

1. For the successful prosecution of the war and for hemispheric safety, the Government of the United States has offered to receive dangerous Axis nationals from a number of the American Republics where facilities for the internment or close safeguarding of such Axis nationals do not exist. A considerable number of such Axis nationals have thus been brought to the United States and arrangements are being made for the receipt of more of them.

2. This Government has a number of camps in the United States and more camps are under construction or planned for the internment or detention of civilian enemy aliens. There are being maintained in these camps thousands of such aliens.

3. This Government has also established other camps for prisoners of war which are now in use and in which, by arrangement, there will also be placed large numbers of United Nations prisoners. The accommodation of these prisoners in the United States will leave available abroad considerable quantities of food, clothing, etc., for refugees there which would otherwise be used by those prisoners abroad, while on the other hand, the maintenance of the prisoners in the United States will result in a considerable reduction of supplies available here.

4. There have been set up in the United States a number of relocation centers where approximately 110,000 persons of the Japanese race are being housed and maintained at public expense after removal from vital military areas.

The Government of the United States fully shares the concern expressed by the British Government for the situation of the refugees. It feels, in view of the facts set forth above, that it has been and is making every endeavor to relieve the oppressed and persecuted peoples. In affording asylum to refugees, however, it is and must be bound by legislation enacted by Congress determining the immigration policy of the United States.

The United States is of the opinion that further efforts to solve the problem may best be undertaken through the instrumentality already existing, the executive committee of the Intergovernmental Committee

on Refugees. To this end it may be considered advisable in order to facilitate action by the committee that a preliminary exploration of ways and means be undertaken informally by representatives designated by the Government of the United States and the British Government. Such exploration might be undertaken along the following lines:

A. The refugee problem should not be considered as being confined to persons of any particular race or faith. Nazi measures against minorities have caused the flight of persons of various races and faiths, as well as of other persons because of their political beliefs.

B. Wheresoever practicable, intergovernmental collaboration should be sought in these times of transportation difficulty, shipping shortage, and submarine menace, to the end that arrangements may be determined for temporary asylum for refugees as near as possible to the areas in which those people find themselves at the present time and from which they may be returned to their homelands with the greatest expediency on the termination of hostilities.

C. There should accordingly be considered plans for the maintenance in neutral countries in Europe of those refugees for whose removal provision may not be made. Their maintenance in neutral countries may involve the giving of assurances for their support until they can be repatriated, which support will necessarily come from the United Nations augmented by funds from private sources. It may also involve the giving of assurances in all possible cases by their Governments in exile for their prompt return to their native countries upon the termination of hostilities.

D. The possibilities for the temporary asylum of the refugees, with a view to their repatriation upon the termination of hostilities in countries other than neutral, and their dependencies, should be explored, together with the question of the availability of shipping to effect their movement from Europe.

It is suggested that the British and United States representatives might meet at Ottawa for this preliminary exploration.

[S. Con. Res. 9, 78th Cong., 1st sess.]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the American people view with indignation the atrocities inflicted upon the civilian population in the Nazi occupied countries, and especially the mass murder of Jewish men, women, and children; and

Whereas this policy of the Nazis has created a reign of terror, brutality, and extermination in Poland and other countries in Eastern and Central Europe: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That these brutal and indefensible outrages against millions of helpless men, women, and children should be, and they are hereby, condemned as unworthy of any nation or any regime which pretends to be civilized.

Resolved further, That the dictates of humanity and honorable conduct in war demand that this inexcusable slaughter and mistreatment shall cease and that it is the sense of this Congress that those

guilty, directly or indirectly, of these criminal acts shall be held accountable and punished in a manner commensurate with the offenses for which they are responsible.

Passed the Senate March 9, 1943.

Attest:

EDWIN A. HALSEY,
Secretary.

Passed the House March 18, 1943.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY 19, 1943.

The delegates appointed by the American and British Governments to confer at Bermuda upon the refugee problem have now terminated their discussions and have submitted a report to their respective Governments. The two Governments have received this and are at present engaged in carrying out its recommendations. Throughout the discussions at Bermuda, the United States and British delegations as well as the two Governments worked in complete harmony and in a spirit of mutual cooperation. The report was submitted as a joint report and contains no divergence of opinion.

While the details must be regarded as confidential so long as a knowledge of the recommendations contained therein would be of aid or comfort to our enemies or might adversely affect the refugees whom all are trying to aid, certain facts may now be made public.

The two delegations accomplished the useful task of dividing suggestions and proposals for the solution of the refugee problem into two categories: (1) what was possible under existing war conditions and (2) what was impossible under these same conditions.

All suggestions were measured by two strict criteria. In the first place, nothing could be recommended that would interfere with or delay the war effort of the United Nations, and, secondly, any recommendation submitted must be capable of accomplishment under war conditions.

The shipping problem was recognized to be of the utmost urgency and it was agreed that any plan looking to the diverting of allied shipping from the war effort to remove or care for refugees would present considerations of a military character which would disclose almost insuperable difficulties. It was also agreed that no negotiations with Hitler could be undertaken since his entire record has left no doubt that he would only agree to such solutions as would be of direct aid to the Axis war aims.

The conference was, however, able to recommend measures both for removing refugees from neutral countries and, in those cases where such removal was not possible, for giving assurances of international cooperation in the future of the refugee problem so far as it affected them.

It also recommended a number of temporary refugee havens to which refugees could be transported and maintained if and when shipping should become available. At least one such movement has been effected.

Certain measures of a financial nature to cover necessary expenses and a declaration of intention to provide for repatriation upon the termination of hostilities were also recommended.

The conference also submitted a plan for an expanded and more efficient intergovernmental organization with increased authority to meet the problems created or likely to arise under war conditions.

Some of these measures are now being put into effect and others, it is hoped, will soon be possible. It is therefore believed that the practical results of the recommendations submitted by the conference will soon become apparent.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, ADDRESSED TO DR. MAX LERNER, CHAIRMAN, PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JEWISH CONFERENCE, AT HOTEL COMMODORE, NEW YORK CITY, JULY 26, 1943

In reply to your telegram of July 15, 1943, asking a message to the Emergency Conference to Save the Jewish People of Europe, I am glad to transmit a message from the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, which has my full concurrence. You are aware of the interest of this Government in the terrible condition of the European Jews and of our repeated endeavors to save those who could be saved. These endeavors will not cease until Nazi power is forever crushed.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADDRESSED TO DR. MAX LERNER, CHAIRMAN, PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JEWISH CONFERENCE, HOTEL COMMODORE, NEW YORK CITY, JULY 26, 1943

The rescue of the Jewish people, of course, and of other peoples likewise marked for slaughter by Nazi savagery, is under constant examination by the State Department, and any suggestion calculated to that end will be gladly considered. An intergovernmental agency has been created designed to deal with these problems. You will readily realize that no measure is practicable unless it is consistent with the destruction of Nazi tyranny; and that the final defeat of Hitler and the rooting out of the Nazi system is the only complete answer. This Government in cooperation with the British Government has agreed upon those measures which have been found to be practicable under war conditions, and steps are now being taken to put them into effect.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONVENTION OF THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

SEPTEMBER 9, 1943.

As the delegates to this conference assemble to consider means of alleviating the suffering of the Jewish populations of Europe, I cannot but express my horror at the cruelties visited upon innocent peoples by the Axis authorities in the territories they occupy. The attitude of this Government in regard to these atrocities was ably expressed by the Secretary of State in the statement issued on October 30, 1942, and I wish to emphasize that all feasible measures are being adopted to lessen the sufferings of the persecuted Jews of Europe. I am

confident that the helpful contributions made by American citizens toward the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine will be continued.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
September 29, 1943.

The Secretary of State has issued the following message on the occasion of the celebration of the Jewish New Year:

On the occasion of the celebration of the Jewish New Year I desire to extend my greetings to all Americans of the Jewish faith. It seems appropriate at this season to express again my constant sympathy with them in their sorrow over those of their religion who still live and die in the deep shadow of persecution. It is also appropriate at this time for us to rejoice together over the world's quickening hope for the dawn of a new year in which we may realize peace at last for all the great brotherhood of mankind.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

OCTOBER 15, 1943.

I have been informed that the Argentine Government has suspended the publication of Jewish newspapers some of which have been in existence for many years. While this matter is of course one which concerns primarily the Argentine Government and people, I cannot forbear to give expression to my own feeling of apprehension at the taking in this hemisphere of action obviously anti-Semitic in nature and of a character so closely identified with the most repugnant features of Nazi doctrine. I believe that this feeling is shared by the people of the United States and by the people of the other American republics. In this connection I recall that one of the resolutions adopted at the Eighth International Conference of American States at Lima in 1938 set forth that "any persecution on account of racial or religious motives which makes it impossible for a group of human beings to live decently, is contrary to the political and juridical systems of America."

STATEMENT SIGNED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND PREMIER STALIN

NOVEMBER 1, 1943.

DECLARATION OF GERMAN ATROCITIES

The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres, and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all the peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that

in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid 3 Allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the 32 (33) United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres, and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, and Italy.

Thus, the Germans who take part in wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian, or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by the joint decision of the governments of the Allies.

(Signed) ROOSEVELT.
STALIN.
CHURCHILL.

EXTRACT FROM ADDRESS OF HON. CORDELL HULL, SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE JOINT MEETING OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, NOVEMBER 18, 1943

* * * The Conference also served as an occasion for a solemn public declaration by the heads of the three governments with regard to the perpetrators of the bestial and abominable crimes committed by the Nazi leaders against the harassed and persecuted inhabitants of occupied territories—against people of all races and religions, among whom Hitler has reserved for the Jews his most brutal wrath. Due punishment will be administered for all these crimes. * * *

APPROPRIATIONS FOR REFUGEE RELIEF

(\$85,000,000 has been appropriated for refugee relief, of which \$0,000,000 has been expended up to the present time)

[PUBLIC RESOLUTION—No. 88—76TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 432—3D SESSION]

[H. J. Res. 544]

JOINT RESOLUTION

Making appropriations for work relief and relief, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941

* * * SEC. 40. (a) The President is hereby authorized through such agency or agencies as he may designate to purchase exclusively in the United States and to transport, and to distribute as hereinafter provided, agricultural, medical, and other supplies for the relief of refugee men, women, and children, who have been driven from their homes or otherwise rendered destitute by hostilities or invasion. When so purchased, such materials and supplies are hereby authorized to be distributed by the President through the American Red Cross or such governmental or other agencies as he may designate.

(b) There is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of \$50,000,000, to be available until June 30, 1941, for carrying out the purposes of this section, including the cost of such purchases, the transportation to point of distribution, and distribution, administrative, and other costs, but not including any administrative expense incurred by any nongovernmental agency.

(c) Any governmental agency so designated to aid in the purchase, transportation or distribution of any such materials and supplies may expend any sums allocated to it for such designated purposes without regard to the provisions of any other Act. * * *

Approved, June 26, 1940.

[PUBLIC LAW 150—77TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 273—1ST SESSION]

[H. R. 5166]

AN ACT

Making appropriations to supply deficiencies in certain appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, and for prior fiscal years, to provide supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1942, and for other purposes

REFUGEE RELIEF

* * * The unexpended balance of the appropriation of \$50,000,000 for relief of refugees rendered destitute by hostilities or invasion contained in section 40 of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, fiscal year 1941, is hereby continued available until June 30, 1942. * * *

Approved, July 3, 1941.

[PUBLIC LAW 353—77TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 501—1ST SESSION]

[H. R. 6160]

AN ACT

Making supplemental appropriations for the national defense for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1942, and June 30, 1943, and for other purposes.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FOREIGN WAR RELIEF

* * * To enable the President through such agency or agencies as he may designate to purchase exclusively in the United States and to transport, and to distribute as hereinafter provided, medical, agricultural, and other supplies for the relief of men, women, and children, who have been rendered sick or destitute as a result of hostilities or invasion, fiscal year 1942, \$35,000,000, including the cost of such purchases, the transportation to point of distribution, and distribution, administrative and other costs, but not including any administrative expense incurred by any nongovernmental agency: *Provided*, That when so purchased, such materials and supplies are hereby authorized to be distributed by the President through the American Red Cross or such governmental or other agencies as he may designate: *Provided further*, That any governmental agency so designated to aid in the purchase, transportation, or distribution of any such materials and supplies may expend any sums allocated to it for such designated purposes without regard to the provisions of any other Act. * * *

Approved, December 17, 1941.

[PUBLIC LAW 648—77TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 476—2D SESSION]

[H. R. 7233]

AN ACT

Making appropriations to supply deficiencies in certain appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1942, and for prior fiscal years, and for other purposes.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FOREIGN WAR RELIEF

* * * The unexpended balance of the appropriation of \$50,000,000 for relief of refugees rendered destitute by hostilities or invasion, contained in section 40 of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, fiscal year 1941, and the appropriation of \$35,000,000 for foreign war relief, contained in the Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, are hereby consolidated and made one fund effective as of December 17, 1941, which fund shall be available until June 30, 1943, for all the objects and purposes of such consolidated appropriations. * * *

Approved, July 2, 1942.

[PUBLIC LAW 182—78TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 218—1ST SESSION]

[H. R. 3714]

AN ACT

Making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in certain appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943, and for prior fiscal years, and for other purposes.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FOREIGN WAR RELIEF

* * * The appropriation "Foreign war relief" contained in the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1942, is hereby continued available until June 30, 1944. * * *

Approved July 12, 1943.

(H. Res. 352, shown below, is similar to H. Res. 350 and S. Res. 203.)

[H. Res. 352, 78th Cong., 1st sess.]

RESOLUTION

Providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe

Whereas the Congress of the United States, by concurrent resolution adopted on March 15 of this year, expressed its condemnation of Nazi Germany's "mass murder of Jewish men, women, and children", a mass crime which has already exterminated close to two million human beings, about 30 per centum of the total Jewish population of Europe and which is growing in intensity as Germany approaches defeat; and

Whereas the American tradition of justice and humanity dictates that all possible means be employed to save from this fate the surviving Jews of Europe, some four million souls who have been rendered homeless and destitute by the Nazis: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives recommends and urges the creation by the President of a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the surviving Jewish people of Europe from extinction at the hands of Nazi Germany.

X